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Résumé 
 
Ce mémoire vise à évaluer les effets de variations des attentes des firmes quant à la protection 
conférée par les droits de propriété intellectuelle (« PI ») pour les inventions et innovations 
dans un milieu industriel d’innovation ouverte. D’abord, les régimes de PI aux États-Unis et 
au Canada sont analysés à travers des cas jurisprudentiels et législatifs et des traités 
internationaux afin d’illustrer de quelle façon les normes juridiques changent et démontrer les 
répercussions sur les attentes des firmes. Puis, les attributs du modèle de l’innovation ouverte, 
où les firmes gèrent à dessein leurs relations d’affaires avec une attitude d’ouverture, sont 
décrits et sa pertinence est appuyée à l’aide d’un modèle simple. L’accent est mis sur son 
traitement distinctif des échanges de connaissances et d’intrants à l’intérieur même des firmes 
et entre elles. Une fois ces notions établies et s’y référant à titre d’hypothèses, un modèle 
microéconomique des échanges de connaissances entre firmes est élaboré, avec deux variables 
de choix, la PI et le secret, qui captent les mécanismes de gestion technologique des firmes. 
Par la tension entre ces variables, les processus de prise de décisions et les interactions entre 
les firmes sont évalués au moyen d’une analyse statique. Pour étudier plus en détails les choix 
des firmes, une version à deux joueurs du modèle est examinée au moyen de la théorie des 
jeux. Dans toutes ces formes du modèle, l’impact des fluctuations des attentes des firmes 
relativement au droit de la PI est jaugé. Tel que prévu, ces effets pour une firme changent en 
fonction des choix de gestion de chacune des firmes. Les effets varient également eu égard à la 
nature des relations à travers lesquelles les échanges de connaissance ont lieu. Dans la variante 
à deux joueurs, la statique comparative d’un équilibre de Nash en stratégie mixte montre que 
la relation avec l’autre joueur imprègne les incidences des variations du droit sur les stratégies 
de gestion technologique. Par exemple, une hausse des attentes de protection juridique de la PI 
couvrant la technologie d’une firme peut étonnamment mener cette firme à moins y recourir. 
 
Mots-clés: Propriété intellectuelle – Brevets – Secrets commerciaux – Innovation – Innovation 
ouverte – Gestion de la technologie – Théorie microéconomique – Théorie des jeux – 
Organisation industrielle – Droit de la propriété intellectuelle  
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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the effects of changes in firms’ expectations of 
intellectual property (“IP”) law protection over inventions and innovations in an industrial 
environment characterized by open innovation practices. To begin, a legal analysis of IP 
regimes in Canada and the United States is achieved through different cases of court decisions, 
legal amendments and international treaties in order to show how legal standards vary and to 
demonstrate the repercussions of legal shifts over firms’ expectations. Then, the characteristics 
of the open innovation management model, in which firms adopt a purposively open mindset 
in their business relationships, are described, and its relevance is supported using a simple 
model. Emphasis is laid upon open innovation’s distinguishable treatment of intra- and inter-
firm flows of knowledge and inputs. Building on these insights and using them as 
assumptions, a microeconomic model of firms’ knowledge flow interactions is constructed, 
with two choice variables that capture firms’ technology management mechanisms in an open 
innovation industrial environment: IP and secrecy. Through the tension between these two 
variables, inter-firm interactions and decision-making processes are assessed with a static 
analysis. To study firms’ choices in greater detail, a two-firm version of the model is then 
examined using game theory. Throughout, the impact of fluctuations in firms’ expectations of 
IP law is assessed. As expected, these effects, for a focal firm, vary depending on that firm’s 
technology management decisions as well as other firms’. Effects also differ with respect to 
the nature of knowledge flows relationships that each firm undertakes. In the two-firm game 
theoretic version of the model, comparative statics of a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium show 
that the relationship with the other firm qualifies the consequences of legal shifts on firms’ 
technology management strategies. Notably, increasing expectations of IP protection for a 
firm’s technology might actually result in this firm relying less on IP. 
 
Keywords: Intellectual Property – Patents – Trade Secrets – Innovation – Open Innovation – 
Technology Management – Microeconomic Theory – Game Theory – Industrial Organization 
– Intellectual Property Law  
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Foreword 
 
This thesis is the result of a research project submitted to, and supported by, the Fonds de 
recherche du Québec – Société et culture. This project proposed using an interdisciplinary 
perspective combining economics, law and management to analyze, when they are guided by 
an open innovation approach, firms’ responses to shifts in intellectual property law. In order to 
abide by this interdisciplinary mandate, this thesis departs from work traditionally published in 
economics. The first two chapters respectively focus on law and management, while economic 
modeling begins only in Chapter 3. Readers interested exclusively on this thesis’ content in 
microeconomic theory are invited to read the Introduction, the beginning of Chapter 1 (before 
Section 1.1), Section 2.1 and then jump to Chapter 3. Where other ideas, concepts and 
examples from the first two chapters appear in Chapter 3, footnotes refer these readers back. 
 
On a personal note: interdisciplinary work is undervalued. The world, human life and 
their respective phenomenal manifestations are too complex to be fully understood through the 
lens of a single discipline. I believe strongly that more truth can be found in ties between 
disciplines than in single disciplinary nodes. Take this thesis: it is guided by a legal context; 
the subject is technology management; and the analysis is economic. Law sets the pragmatic 
boundaries. Economic modeling allows generalization and prediction. Management provides 
empirical bedrock that supports the theoretical assumptions and translates the analysis in 
concrete action. Each of these disciplines contributes in its own, singular way to this research. 
 
In this thesis, legal sources—legislations and decisions—are indicated using footnotes, as 
recommended by, and in the manner prescribed in, the Canadian Guide to Uniform Legal 
Citation, 8th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2014). This method has been chosen because of the 
difficulty of inserting in-text citations to legal sources that do not impair the text’s readability 
while still being detailed enough for readers unfamiliar with law to understand the reference. 
Abbreviations are either broken down or explained the first time they appear. 
  
Introduction: What Firms See and What Firms Get 
 
Microeconomic theory is predicated on the idea that firms maximize the net value 
associated with their products by choosing optimal cost and revenue variables within their 
purview, while taking into account exogenous elements outside of their control. Several of 
these elements are generated by the legal environment, which imposes constraints on firms’ 
actions or gives access to a whole array of hitherto impracticable opportunities. Firms whose 
products are inventive or innovative in nature are particularly concerned as the existence and 
scope of legal regimes of intellectual property (“IP”) greatly affect the range of choices 
available to them. 
 
Most microeconomic models of intellectual property assume that IP rights will be granted 
whenever firms apply for them (e.g., Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar 2011; Miceli 2009; 
Carlton and Perloff 2008; Scotchmer 2004; Landes and Posner 2003; Gilbert and Shapiro 
1990; Tirole 1988). This is not a bug but a feature, because modelling requires a context to be 
reduced to its simplest form in order to better analyze the particular factor(s) under analysis 
(Nicholson and Snyder 2012; Ostrom 2005). To accurately examine firms’ interactions with 
IP, this simplification must be dispensed with. When firms elect whether to rely on IP 
protection or not, they typically have no ex ante certainty that IP rights will be granted or shall 
be enforceable against competitors and other third parties—in other words, certainty about 
these rights’ validity and breadth (Lemley and Shapiro 2005; Leffler and Leffler 2003). In 
these circumstances and under the axioms of Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944), risk-neutral 
firms rather maximize their technologies’ expected net value, or the part thereof they can 
capture. Firms’ level of expectations turns into a major parameter in their decision-making 
processes. 
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This perspective is not only closer to reality: so long as no specific value for expectations 
is asserted, it also stands strong when hypotheses of rational and cognizant agents are abated. 
For firms’ technology managers, case law and statutes are one discourse, but only one among 
many others, that creates “IP law as everyday life” (Murray, Piper and Robertson 2014a). 
These managers’ beliefs regarding the state of IP law, and associated expectations and 
decisions, are also influenced by the media, discussions with colleagues and friends, corporate 
policies, industrial practices, social values, community norms, and so on. Each of these 
discourses is in turn affected by assessments of actual IP law. Some of them, for instance 
when they are supported by legal advice, are more likely than others to closely reflect the state 
of IP law. Still, whether or not these beliefs are exact, it remains that firms take decisions 
based on expectations. These more or less accurate expectations directly or indirectly echo the 
actual state of IP law, just like a funhouse mirror, despite proportions that may be shrunk or 
protracted, reflects the same objects that could be observed through an immaculate looking 
glass. 
 
Analyzing the scenario of expectations becomes particularly significant under conditions 
of unstable or shifting legal environments in connection with IP. Expectations fluctuate as 
legislative bodies amend and vote laws, and as courts refine interpretations of legal texts and 
concepts. Patent law is especially affected by the legal process: by construction, as patent law 
has to deal with unforeseen and unanticipated technologies,
1
 the ground on which its rules are 
built is bound to remain somewhat unsteady. Firms operating in industrial sectors at the 
forefront of technological development have to deal regularly with uncertain and shifting legal 
expectations. As tellingly illustrated below,
2
 biotechnologies and information and 
communication technologies (“ICT”), two industries whose social and economic contributions 
need no introduction, are sectors that are currently evolving in the aftermath of such legal 
shifts. The purpose of this paper is to investigate, with a model of microeconomic theory, the 
impact of shifts in IP law on firms’ choices, through the role of expectations in firms’ 
                                                          
1
  Harvard College v Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 Canada Supreme Court Reports 45 at paras 
10, 158. 
2
  See respectively Sections 1.1 and 1.2. 
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decision-making processes. To push this examination beyond theoretical underpinnings, legal 
and management perspectives, concepts and ideas join the economic treatment to provide an 
interdisciplinary analysis. 
 
Incidentally, there exists a second set of ex ante uncertainty and correlated expectations 
that influence firms’ decision-making processes in technology management: uncertainty about 
the market demand for a firm’s technology, and the products it offers that incorporate it 
(Lemley and Shapiro 2005; O’Connor 2010). Although these factors are constantly taken into 
consideration herein, notably by preferring not to formalize IP with monopoly models and 
theory (see, e.g., Bruneau 2013 for a critique of Boldrin and Levine’s (2008) use of 
“monopoly”), they are not the focus of this paper. 
 
To show the repercussions of the legal environment surrounding technological activities 
on firms’ expectations of IP protection, Chapter 1 features actual industry responses to court 
rulings and legal amendments. It focuses on patent law in biotechnology and ICT industries, 
but equivalent contexts are described for the exogenous impact of other IP legal regimes—like 
copyright, trademarks, layout-designs, geographical indications, industrial designs
3
 and plant 
breeders’ rights. By using legal decisions as the backbone of this review of legal shifts, 
Chapter 1 actually performs a central aspect of this paper, i.e., to consider expectations of IP 
protection exogenously. Chapter 2 outlines other core notions of this paper with respect to the 
industrial ecosystem, focusing on the distinction between inventions and innovations. As this 
qualification captures the cumulative nature of the innovation process, it is crucial to 
adequately address the role of IP in firms’ behaviour (Frischmann 2012; Scotchmer 2004; 
Landes and Posner 2003; Gallini 2002). To represent this distinction, this paper’s model 
implies an industrial environment characterized by practices of open innovation. Open 
innovation is a management approach in which decision makers deliberately keep the firm’s 
boundaries open, thus facilitating inward and outward flows of knowledge, technologies and 
                                                          
3
  In the United States, industrial designs are known as design patents, in contradistinction with utility patents. 
To avoid this double usage of patents, the Canadian term is preferred herein. 
4 
 
research projects throughout the innovation process (Chesbrough 2003). Although using open 
innovation as the infrastructure of this paper’s model reduces the scope of its conclusions, it 
provides two noteworthy advantages. First, reminiscent of the previous remark regarding 
models and simplifications, it renders the model workable. Second, as firms in the 
biotechnological and ICT sectors have extensively adopted processes typically associated with 
open innovation (Gassmann, Enkel and Chesbrough 2010), this management model combines 
well with the legal exposition of Chapter 1 in order to construct a model that can isolate and 
identify the effects of shifts in firms’ expectations of IP protection. Together, these chapters 
establish this paper’s conceptual framework.  
 
These first two chapters having paved the way for this paper’s objectives and the 
foundations of its most important assumptions, it is then possible in Chapter 3 to model firms’ 
behaviour in an industrial setting characterized by practices of open innovation. As is typical 
in discussions of technology management (Teece 1986; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000; 
Graham et al 2009), the choice of each firm, which maximizes the value it captures out of its 
technology, is structured along the trade-off between IP protection and secrecy. Unlike the 
other chapters, Chapter 3 is written for a readership that is well-versed in the field of 
microeconomic theory.  
 
Economic analysis takes place in a two-prong manner. First, comparative statics are used 
to study general multi-firm interactions in the industrial environment. By establishing the 
different constraints and processes of technology management in this environment, insights for 
a number of distinctive firms and industrial contexts are found. For instance, non-practicing 
entities, firms that invent but do not innovate, do not benefit from secretive practices 
according to the model’s results. In the context of tensions between IP protection and secrecy, 
these firms are thus relatively more likely to be interested in IP protection and to 
unambiguously benefit from legal shifts that increase expectations of IP protection. 
Furthermore, in an industrial environment comprised exclusively of computer programming 
5 
 
firms, it is observed that copyright protection constitutes a dominant strategy of technology 
management.  
 
Next, through a game theoretic analysis of a two-firm version of the model, dominant-, 
pure- and mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria are identified. By examining this game, it is noticed 
that a unique, dominant-strategy Nash Equilibrium usually arises when the possibility that 
both firms choose IP protection does not produce judiciary interactions, such as litigation. If a 
dominant-strategy Nash Equilibrium exists, the intuitive effects of legal shifts on firms’ 
likelihood to choose IP protection are confirmed by the model, as well as corresponding 
results on their incentive to participate in technological activities. In the event that an 
interaction of IP litigation would occur, the likelihood of a dominant-strategy Nash 
Equilibrium is infinitesimal. Then focusing on the model’s potential mixed-strategy Nash 
Equilibrium, it is shown that the impact of legal shifts in this equilibrium vary mostly in 
relation with the other firm’s technology management decisions. Counter-intuitively, legal 
shifts increasing expectations of IP rights’ validity and enforceability for a firm’s technology, 
ceteris paribus, do not necessarily increase the likelihood that this firm seeks IP protection, 
rather the opposite in some circumstances.  
  
Chapter 1: Navigating Through Intellectual Property Law 
 
The patent system is a “statutory creature”,4 a bargain in which inventors obtain a 
temporary exclusivity over the use of their inventions in exchange for public disclosure, a 
design whose end-purpose is to encourage research activities (Scotchmer 2004; Gallini 2002). 
Advocates of the patent system argue that research stimulation emerges from both sides of this 
quid pro quo, in a two-prong impetus: exclusion rights act as a commercial incentive to invent, 
to exploit inventions, or both (Plant 1934), while public disclosure, restrictions to patentable 
subject matter and finite terms of protection maintain and enrich the public domain for 
scientific and technological ideas, a source of building blocks of knowledge on which other 
inventors and innovators can further stand for their own inventive and innovative endeavours 
(Frischmann 2012; Machlup 1958; Machlup and Penrose 1950).  
 
This reasoning being laden with conjectural suppositions on the direct and indirect effects 
of the patent system, it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately assess its cogency (Moore 
2003; Machlup 1958). On the one hand, absent a regime of patents, its benefits would not 
vanish, since some of the system’s alternatives, like trade secrets and rewards associated with 
academic advancement, provide incentives to invent, while others, including open source 
licensing, dedication to the public domain and academic publication, disclose technological 
knowledge freely and readily. On the other hand, patents are not socially free, as they come 
with the notorious, competition-inhibiting cost of strengthening the patentee’s market position 
and impeding short-term subsequent research (Bruneau 2013; Boldrin and Levine 2008). 
There are plainly too many alternatives to patents to confidently declare what would occur 
without this system and pronounce a clear-cut verdict on its effectiveness. Therefore, the 
patent rationale is not disputed or supported herein, but is instead contemplated objectively: 
regardless of one’s assertions about the desirability of the patent system, one cannot ignore 
that patent law exists, and that it is propped on this rationale. By the mere existence of this 
                                                          
4
  Apotex Inc v Wellcome Foundation Ltd, [2002] 4 Canada Supreme Court Reports 153 at para 37, Justice 
Binnie. 
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prop and the structure it supports, inventors have the option of applying for patents and are 
socially encouraged to do so. Rather than debating whether to take down this structure or not, 
this paper is mostly concerned by how firms behave with and around it. 
 
In line with this orthodox rationale, patentability of an invention usually requires four 
conditions: patent-eligible subject matter, novelty, non-obviousness and usefulness.
5
 The first 
condition is satisfied when the patent application does not merely cover “laws of nature, 
natural phenomena and abstract ideas”.6 Concentrating on the second prong of the patent 
rationale, it purports to guarantee that the “basic tools of scientific and technological work”,7 
the most fundamental building blocks of knowledge, are not pre-empted and hence remain 
available for everybody to use in their scientific and research inquiries (Frischmann 2012; 
Landes and Posner 2003).
8
 Because nature, pure science and ideas are fundamental, patent law 
theory supposes that allowing their appropriation, even temporarily, causes too much harm to 
society through the imposition of undue impediments to others’ research projects. The other 
three conditions are satisfied when legal thresholds of novelty, non-obviousness and 
(expected) usefulness are met (Gervais and Judge 2011; Pires de Carvalho 2010). The purpose 
of these three requirements and other limitations unspecified herein is to ensure that the social 
costs of granting exclusion rights to inventors are outweighed by the social benefits derived 
from additional new, useful and inventive activities (Landes and Posner 2003; Gervais and 
Judge 2011).
9
 Keeping both prongs of the patent rationale in mind, it is assumed in the 
                                                          
5
  In Canada, Patent Act, RSC 1985, c P-4, sections 2 “invention”, 27(8), 28.2, 28.3 [Patent Act]. “RSC” refers 
to Revised Statutes of Canada. In the United States, 35 USC §101-03. “USC” stands for United States Code. 
For the 161 members (as of April 26, 2015) of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), aspects of the last 
three conditions are mandatory by application of Paragraph 27(1) of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, better known under the name “TRIPS”; Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 15 April 
1994, 1869 UNTS 299, WTO [TRIPS]. For international requirements, reference to the TRIPS is preferred to 
reference to treaties of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) because the TRIPS benefits 
from enforcement procedures, unlike WIPO treaties. The WTO thus exerts direct pressure on its members to 
implement the TRIPS’ standards (Pires de Carvalho 2010). 
6
  Diamond v Diehr, 450 United States Reports 175 (1981) at 185. United States Reports is the official reporter 
of the U.S. Supreme Court. Patent-eligibility in Canada follows similar principles; Patent Act, ibid at 27(8). 
7
  Gottschalk v Benson, 409 United States Reports 63 (1972) at 67. 
8
  Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, 132 Supreme Court Reporter 1289 (2012). 
9
  Apotex Inc v Wellcome Foundation Ltd, supra note 4 at para 37, Justice Binnie. 
8 
 
construction of the patent system that exclusion rights conferred to inventions missing any of 
these three criteria are more likely to produce less social benefits than costs.  
 
Interestingly, these four conditions are guided by utilitarian principles, a fortiori in the 
United States, where the Constitution specifically provides that the legislative power of 
Congress with respect to patent and copyright law must be exercised “to promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts”.10 In that respect, it should be noted that patent law theory and 
microeconomic theory both follow utility maximization principles, a convergence that 
supports this paper’s integrative approach. 
 
Depending on the singular characteristics of their inventions, firms contemplating patents 
in the course of their knowledge and technology management may be more or less confident 
that they meet the aforementioned four requirements. Besides, the issuance of a patent only 
creates a presumption of its validity:
11
 any alleged infringer is allowed, as a defense in court, 
to challenge the patent on the ground that one of the four conditions is not complied with.
12
  
 
Patents that have been granted can be rebuffed because of the incomplete and imperfect 
nature of the examination process. For the sake of concision, only the novelty and non-
obviousness criteria of this process are discussed here. When examiners review whether the 
invention claimed is novel and non-obvious, they look for what is called “prior art”, which is 
composed, roughly, of anything that is publicly known (Gervais and Judge 2011; Lemley and 
Shapiro 2005; Jaffe and Lerner 2004). If the invention claimed in the patent application 
already exists in prior art, it cannot be new. Non-obviousness is assessed from the point of 
view of a person “of ordinary skill in the [prior] art”: if that imaginary person finds the 
                                                          
10
  US Constitution, article I, § 8, clause 8. See Justice Stevens’ concurrence in Bilski v Kappos, 130 Supreme 
Court Reporter 3218 (2010) for a discussion about how this constitutional proviso frames U.S. patent law in 
general, the U.S. standard for patent-eligibility in particular. 
11
  In Canada, Patent Act, supra note 5 at sections 42, 43(2). In the United States, 35 USC §282(a). 
12
  In Canada, Patent Act, supra note 5 at section 59. In the United States, 35 USC §282(b)(2). 
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invention obvious, the patent application fails at the non-obviousness criterion. As patent 
examiners are indeed human and not omniscient and as the governmental institutions 
responsible for patent examination face time and budgetary constraints, the screening of prior 
art is usually confined to the examiner’s technical knowledge, elements submitted by the 
applicant and searches of published patents (Carrier 2009). The prior art reviewed during this 
examination is thus not exhaustive. It ensues that, in order for the examination process to carry 
out the patent rationale instead of being a matter of chance, patents issued at the end of this 
process should be rebuffable. 
 
From the perspective of rational and risk-neutral users, whether other firms or customers, 
this inevitable uncertainty is borne in mind each time they incur expenses to use or access a 
patented technology (O’Connor 2010), as they weigh the certain costs of treating the patent as 
valid against the potentially lower expected costs of betting on the patent being invalid, based 
on users’ expectations of the patent’s validity (Lemley and Shapiro 2005). IP law’s exhaustion 
doctrine is a noteworthy aspect to keep in mind to discuss users’ bets. When a product 
containing an IP-protected component is lawfully transferred, the IP right is said to be 
exhausted, meaning that a legitimate transferee can use the product free from the restrictions 
of IP law’s exclusionary rights (Correa 2007; Pires de Carvalho 2010). Put simply, as is the 
case for any other good one possesses, the lawful transferee can use the product, sell it, repair 
it, include it as an input in one’s own innovation or production processes or even destroy it.13 
Nonetheless, exhaustion affects only the product, not the right itself: making a copy of an IP-
protected product without sufficient authorization constitutes IP infringement, even for a 
lawful transferee of the product. This aspect of IP regimes is taken into account when users 
assess the probabilities associated with their wagers. Licenses and similar contractual 
arrangements, however, allow IP right-holders to ignore some considerations of IP exhaustion 
since, in these situations, contract law takes over IP law. In fact, licensing is often relied on 
                                                          
13
  For copyright specifically, some jurisdictions do have special limitations to IP exhaustion under the form of 
moral rights. In Canada and U.S. jurisdictions where some moral rights are granted, they are confined to an 
author’s right to have his or her name associated with the work (or to stay anonymous) and to some rights 
regarding the work’s integrity (Gervais and Judge 2011; Landes and Posner 2003). From this paper’s 
technological viewpoint, the impact of moral rights on the exhaustion doctrine is thus negligible. 
10 
 
with the explicit intention of overriding concerns about exhaustion. It largely explains the 
prevalence of licensing practices by free and open source software (“F/OSS”)14 proponents, a 
community of programmers united by their advocacy of wide and “free” access to computer 
programs and their code. To promote this goal, F/OSS programmers routinely tether licenses 
to use the IP-protected computer programs and code they developed to heavy restrictions in 
regard to the methods by which subsequent software applications, incorporating F/OSS code 
or applications, may be commercially exploited (Phillips 2009).
15
 
 
Now looking from the perspective of inventive firms, uncertainty surrounding the 
invention’s patentability is first reckoned with when deciding to patent or not a technology. 
For inventive firms, the main alternative to patents—albeit not the only, as has been brought 
up earlier in this chapter—consists in keeping the technology secret (Landes and Posner 
2003). With trade secrets as well, there exists an intrinsic uncertainty regarding the firm’s 
ability to confine the knowledge within its boundaries, and some legal mechanisms can 
increase firms’ expectations to that effect, such as laws that punish trespasses and breaches of 
contract, or that forbid theft and reverse-engineering (Lemley 2011; Gervais and Judge 2011). 
For trade secrecy as well, the analysis of firms’ choices is accompanied by an assessment of 
the exogenous legal context and of expectations of protection. For inventive firms, trade 
secrets’ main weakness is that they do not confer exclusion rights: should competitors 
independently invent or innovate the same technology, they can use it (Landes and Posner 
                                                          
14
  As the saying goes, “free as in free speech, not as in free beer” (Stallman 2002, 43). The distinction between 
free and open source software is beyond the scope of this paper. Readers interested in this nuance are directed 
to Raymond (1999), Stallman (2002) and Phillips (2009).  
15
  Because of the complexity of the legal context, the wording of this sentence is very specific and may look 
odd. The two main licenses used in F/OSS movements are the GNU General Public License and Creative 
Commons. In general, the right to use conferred by these licenses is annulled should their conditions not be 
complied with. Two events ensue. First, contract law leaves (or gives back) the ground to IP law. Second, by 
definition, an annulment is retroactive. By this retroactive termination, it is not only this subsequent 
application’s commercial exploitation (through means disallowed by the license) that violates the IP right, but 
the use of the computer program altogether. Therefore, all of the license’s conditions apply to the use itself, 
including those terms that do not relate to the use. Should the software be given or sold instead of licensed, as 
a result of the exhaustion doctrine, the mere use of the software application would never violate the IP right, 
although, in all likelihood, the subsequent product’s commercial exploitation would still be disallowed 
because of the unauthorized reproduction of IP-protected software. To hearken back to the larger context of 
this paragraph, this means that users’ legal liability, and thus the monetary value of the expected risks in 
users’ bets, can be sizably higher or lower depending on the transfer mechanism. 
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2003). However, unlike patents, trade secrecy has the benefit of being strictly factual: in 
addition to its immediacy, it does not require regulatory approval (Lemley 2011). 
 
Had an inventive firm chosen to patent, uncertainty surrounding the invention’s 
patentability then re-spawns every time the firm has to pay renewal fees for maintaining its 
patent—through the mechanism of renewal fees, a large proportion of patents are forfeited 
before the end of the statutory term of protection (Bessen and Meurer 2008)—or when it elects 
to enforce its exclusion right (O’Connor 2010). This last distinctive trait brings Lemley and 
Shapiro (2005, 75) to describe a patent not as a right to exclude, but as a right to try to 
exclude, by means of enforcement. Strong patents, in this line of reasoning, are those for 
which expectations of validity, concomitant with the associated right to exclude, are high. 
Conditional to a sturdy demand for products that incorporate the patented invention, strong 
patents significantly enhance a firm’s market position (Gallini 2002) as their strength often 
suffices to guarantee the success of enforcement. Weak patents, unlike their strong 
counterparts, scarcely support their holders’ market positions since invalidation is very 
probable should they be challenged in court. 
 
Throughout this paper, enforcement is understood broadly: it refers to active and direct 
uses of existing IP rights—a range of practices that includes asking third parties to pay 
royalties or to obtain a license, using the IP right as leverage in negotiations or transactions 
with partners, investing in product development associated with a protected invention, setting 
up spin-offs and assigning them some IP titles, litigating against alleged infringers, and many 
more. This delineation of enforcement, however, does not comprise indirect uses of the IP 
right, most notably, the determination of prices for market products that contain components 
protected by IP.  
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This division is justified by the key consideration in rational and risk-neutral firms’ 
enforcement decisions: in a context of uncertainty, because enforcement exposes inventive 
knowledge subsumed in the IP right, firms that choose to enforce their IP rights take risks that 
correspond with the potential wagers of users. In addition to unwanted exposure, enforcement 
often creates a direct opportunity and motivation for users to challenge the IP right’s validity 
(Lemley and Shapiro 2005). Should the IP right be declared invalid, for whatever reason, costs 
of using, sharing and reproducing that knowledge decrease sharply for third parties previously 
exposed to it (Arrow 1959), potentially to zero in the case of digital technologies (Phillips 
2009). The risks of knowledge spillovers and legal challenges are contrastively different for 
market access of products that contain the said IP-protected component. In these cases, unless 
the product carries outward inventive information or the user has technical and legal access to 
reverse-engineering (Cohen and Lemley 2001; Landes and Posner 2003), market users are not 
exposed to the protected knowledge (Plotkin 2009). In the same vein, compared to a producer 
firm’s competitors, a single customer has little incentive to bring upon oneself the litigation 
costs for invalidating a patent (Lemley and Shapiro 2005). These differences explain the 
choice herein of leaving the outcomes of IP rights in price determination of market products 
out of enforcement issues. Other aspects of IP attached to market products, like litigating 
against alleged infringers, remain within this paper’s definition of enforcement. 
 
It is important to realize that there exists no clear-cut divide between user-firms and 
inventor-firms; most firms nowadays are both user and inventor. The two following examples, 
with respect to DNA sequences and computerized business methods, depict this interaction, 
and how firms are affected by shifts in the legal environment. The overall upshot of the legal 
rulings discussed in these examples is represented graphically: Figure 1 gauges the impact of 
these cases on the level of patent protection expected by firms. These two detailed studies are 
then followed by other situations that explore the role of expectations in broader contexts of IP 
law. These examples are referred to regularly in this paper, sometimes to explain and support a 
number of assumptions, other times, to portray different contexts that are examined by the 
model set out in Chapter 3. 
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1.1 The Human Nature, Literally 
 
Starting in the 1970s, the increasing prevalence of biotechnological research awoke many 
interrogations about patenting modified genes and genetically modified organisms. The 
questions were promptly dispelled with respect to non-human, modified genes and genetically 
modified organisms:
16
 they are generally patent-eligible. In the meantime, scientists and 
lawyers continued debating whether human genes and DNA sequences should and could be 
patented, mostly on the terms of the patent rationale sketched above regarding patent-
eligibility: the patent incentive to research activities against the appropriation of fundamental 
building blocks of scientific research. Some firms had been granted patents related to human 
genes, but since no courts had specifically ruled on their validity, uncertainty concerning their 
allowability remained moderately high. Considering the financial value of the patents at stake, 
firms that had patented human genes preferred to withhold the associated exclusivity by not 
offering licenses, although they hesitated at enforcing these uncertain patents because of the 
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Figure 1   Firms' expectations of patent protection over time, for 3 
categories of patents  
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risks of losing their market position should their patents be nullified. Meanwhile, many 
laboratories and firms wished to use, in their own research and products, knowledge disclosed 
in these patents. Nevertheless, they were reluctant to do it because of the high likelihood of 
facing trial should they press on, with a colossal amount of damage compensation at stake.
17
 
 
In Canada, this issue should eventually be debated in court as a case has been filed by the 
Children’s Hospital of Eastern Ontario, challenging the validity of patents issued for human 
genes (Payne 2014). In the United States, the legal controversy was dissolved in a 2013 
Supreme Court decision, Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
18
 in which 
a number of parties—research laboratories and advocates for healthcare patients’ interests—
went to court asking that the human gene patents granted to Myriad Genetics be declared 
invalid.  
 
After many years of hard work, this biotechnology company had successfully identified 
genes that were strongly correlated with risks, for women, of developing breast and ovarian 
cancers. Myriad Genetics applied for and was granted two sets of patent claims for DNA 
sequences. The firm then implemented its discoveries in diagnostic tests that detect if a 
woman carries the said genes. Its most famous and vocal client, actor and director Angelina 
Jolie (Jolie 2013), “came out” right at the moment the Supreme Court was examining the case, 
a media event that boosted demand and commercial value for products associated with these 
genes. Backed by its patents, Myriad Genetics was the only active firm in this market, while 
the patents also hindered firms wishing to enter concomitant markets and offer other health-
related services using these genes, hence the lawsuit. The Court rendered a mitigated ruling, in 
consonance with the aforementioned legal statement that no patents should be granted for 
mere “laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas”: the first set of claims, on 
isolated, naturally-occurring DNA sequences, was invalidated, even though these sequences 
                                                          
17
  This industrial context comes from Association for Molecular Pathology v United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, 689 F 3d 1303 (Fed Cir 2012). “F 3d” stands for Federal Reporter, Third Series. 
18
  Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics, Inc, 133 Supreme Court Reporter 2107 (2013).  
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do not exist, in an isolated state, in nature; however, patent claims from the second set, on 
altered, non-naturally-occurring DNA sequences, remain in force. Concretely, the decision 
erased uncertainty regarding the validity of both sets of claims: firms and other parties 
cognizant of this ruling now have virtually no expectations that patents similar to the first set 
may be valid in the United States, while they are near-certain that patents similar to the second 
set are patent-eligible (see Figure 1). 
 
Myriad Genetics reacted positively to this decision since its remaining patents, now 
ascertained by the top court in the world’s biggest market, were enough to secure its exclusive 
offer of diagnostic services to end-customers (Hurley 2013). Parties involved in the court 
challenge also rejoiced because the ruling confirmed that they could use freely most of the 
knowledge they needed for their own research projects, and eventually offer new consumer 
products banking on these genes (Hurley 2013). These immediate reactions underscore the 
role of expectations on firms’ decisions. On the one hand, Myriad Genetics hinted that it will 
dedicate more attention to its end-user products in the future. On the other hand, other firms 
involved, for which prior expected litigation costs prevented new product offerings or 
scientific endeavours contiguous with these genetic discoveries, are now able to launch their 
business and research plans. Had the patents from the first set been maintained, further 
innovation from these other firms and actors would have cost a lot more, continued to be 
stalled or been canceled. Had the patents from the second set been revoked, an important part 
of industry research related to human genes would probably have been frozen because of the 
considerably higher difficulty for firms, in that scenario, to recoup the massive investments 
required for this research. 
 
1.2 Computerized Business Methods—Tug of War for More Than Twenty Years 
 
The ICT services industry also went through important shifts in patentability expectations. 
It was confirmed in the 1980s that tangible inventions incorporating computer programs could 
16 
 
be patented, for instance, a machine that stops working at definite time intervals based on 
specific computerized calculations.
19
 Nonetheless, the subject of intangible inventions 
incorporating computer programs remains contentious to this day. Inventions at stake here are 
labeled business methods, or, more precisely, computerized business methods when they are 
operated with a computer program. A business method is, as the term implies, a process by 
which something is achieved within a business context.
20
 Patents granted for computerized 
business methods in the banking services industry are at the heart of this legal controversy. For 
example, bankers who have contrived a profitable method to manage their clients’ accounts in 
a way no one thought of before probably created a new, non-obvious and useful business 
method. In order to find out if it could be patented, the only remaining question is whether 
business methods are “abstract ideas” or, alternatively, to determine under which 
circumstances some business methods are mere “abstract ideas”. In the United States, courts’ 
answers to the patent-eligibility of business methods have fluctuated over time, with rippling 
effects in firms’ decisions regarding patent applications and enforcement. In a way similar to 
the analysis for human gene patents, the legal environment and firms’ choices are linked by 
variations in firms’ expectations of patent protection regarding computerized business 
methods. 
 
The first noteworthy court decisions affecting computerized business methods came in the 
1990s. In three consecutive rulings, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
(“CAFC”), the highest U.S. court for patent cases after the Supreme Court, assessed patent-
eligibility of processes (methods) through the lens of an easy-to-satisfy legal standard that was 
later coined “useful, concrete and tangible result”.21 Albeit the first of these judgments, In re 
Alappat, was rendered in 1994, the most important of the three proved to be the 1998 State 
Street decision. In that case, the CAFC ruled that a computer program using pre-determined 
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  Diamond v Diehr, supra note 6. 
20
  Bilski v Kappos, supra note 10. The U.S. Supreme Court also tautologically defines business methods. There 
is simply no other way. In Canadian patent law, process and method are synonymous—see Refrigerating 
Equipment Ltd v Drummond & Waltham System Inc, [1930] 4 Dominion Law Reports 926 at 937—while 
process encompasses method in U.S. patent law; 35 USC §100. 
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  In re Alappat, 33 F 3d 1526 (Fed Cir 1994); State Street Bank and Trust Company v Signature Financial 
Group, Inc, 149 F 3d 1368 (Fed Cir 1998); AT&T Corp v Excel Communications, Inc, 172 F 3d 1352 (Fed Cir 
1999). 
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algorithms to execute a transformation of data—in this instance, amounts of money held in 
clients’ bank accounts—constitutes a “useful, concrete and tangible result”. The computerized 
business method was thus declared patent-eligible. By predicating their conclusions on this 
low standard for processes’ patent-eligibility, the CAFC’s rulings had the joint effect of setting 
aside a higher, and older, legal threshold called “machine-or-transformation”.22 Theoretically, 
levels of legal standards and expectations of patent protection are inversely proportional: the 
easier a legal standard can be satisfied, the higher expectations of patent protection are. 
 
Following these rulings, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”), whose tasks 
include the examination of patent applications and the subsequent grants or rejections of 
patents, had no option but to lower its patent-eligibility standard by adapting its guidelines to 
the low “useful, concrete and tangible result” threshold (Jaffe and Lerner 2004). Moreover, the 
State Street decision received extensive media coverage and attention by firms and patent 
attorneys around the world (Taketa 2002), thereupon spurring a wave of patent applications 
for computerized business methods, in services industries (OECD 2004; USPTO 2000) as well 
as in the software industry (Bessen 2011; Bessen and Hunt 2007; OECD 2004). These 
observations back the theoretical perspective to the effect that the CAFC’s adoption of a very 
low standard for patent-eligibility of computerized business methods enhanced firms’ 
expectations that these patent applications would be valid (see Figure 1), in turn prompting 
firms to file more applications for business methods. Firms’ behaviour quickly adapted to this 
shifting legal environment. 
 
To fully understand the controversy over business method patents, one must remember 
how novelty and non-obviousness are reviewed in the course of patent examination. The 
number of prior art cited during the examination process was comparable between applications 
for conventional patent-eligible subject matter and for computerized business methods 
(Allison and Tiller 2003), but it has been recognized that the quality and relevance of these 
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  Gottschalk v Benson, supra note 7, drawing on principles set out in Cochrane v Deener, 94 United States 
Reports 780 (1877). 
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citations were lower for the latter (Cohen and Lemley 2001). Most of the prior art pondered to 
assess novelty and non-obviousness consists of prior patents, the examiner’s technical 
knowledge and prior art submitted by applicants. Yet, the USPTO had few relevant prior 
patents to rely on during examination since computerized business methods and computer 
programs per se were relatively new subject matter around the time of State Street (Jaffe and 
Lerner 2004; Graham and Mowery 2003). For the same reason, technical knowledge in 
computer programming had not been, until then, an asset that the USPTO sought during its 
hiring process for examiners (USPTO 2000; Graham and Mowery 2003). Finally, for self-
evident reasons, applicants avoid submitting prior art that can spoil their applications (Lemley 
and Shapiro 2005). Consequently, the USPTO was inadequately equipped to satisfyingly 
examine patent applications for computerized business methods (Bessen and Hunt 2007; Jaffe 
and Lerner 2004; USPTO 2000), a satisfying examination process being one in which few 
patents are granted that should not be, and few applications are rejected despite deserving a 
grant.
23
 The main consequence was that, after State Street, many weak patents were issued for 
computerized business methods as novelty and non-obviousness were poorly examined.  
 
As mentioned earlier, because weak patents are likely to be defeated should they be 
challenged in court, they usually provide little benefits in market position for their holders. 
Furthermore, when trying to enforce them, firms put themselves in a vulnerable spot because 
they have low expectations of being able to control the knowledge spillovers that occur with 
enforcement. This reasoning tumbles down when a patent’s weakness stems from lack of 
novelty or non-obviousness, as was the case for many patents for computerized business 
methods: in these circumstances, the patentee surmises its competitors and other firms already 
possess the knowledge. Therefore, these patents serve strictly as assets. The risk of their 
enforcement is limited to losing an asset instead of the more impactful forfeiture of exclusive 
knowledge or market position. Since these assets concretely offer no other advantages, they 
are wasted if they are not enforced.  
 
                                                          
23
  Economists might better know these situations respectively as false positive and false negative. 
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As a result, weak patents for computerized business methods encourage rent-seeking 
practices, where litigation threats are used to compel royalty payments from other parties or to 
procure other counter-benefits, such as cross-licensing (Bessen 2011; Carrier 2009; Boldrin 
and Levine 2008). Inasmuch as the royalty asked for is lower than the notoriously enormous 
costs of patent litigation (even when the defending party is successful in court), rational 
defendants, in the absence of counter-protection, will choose to pay the “rent” (Lemley and 
Shapiro 2005), which becomes an entry fee. In addition to some deadweight loss attributable 
to resources spent for defensive countermeasures, many potentially deleterious effects for 
competition and for the incentives to innovate emerge from this extra rent cost (Boldrin and 
Levine 2008; Carrier 2009).  
 
Strong patents are less likely to result in rent-seeking practices because, in most cases, 
their enforcement is more risky. Though strong patents, by definition, are associated with high 
expectations of validity that decrease the probabilities of enforcement procedures turning 
against the patentee’s interest, the stakes of a defeat are markedly more impactful for strong 
patents, whose inventions are usually incorporated in successful market products, than for 
weak patents. Through their critical role in their holders’ market positions, strong patents 
become more than mere assets. Even when strong patents are used for rent-seeking, the patent 
rationale suggests that they provide higher social benefits, in incentive to invent and innovate 
and in public disclosure of new and non-obvious knowledge, than social costs, through rent-
seeking and higher market prices attributable to a strengthened market position. Patents for 
inventions that are obvious or lack novelty, however, are presumed not to offer sufficient 
compensation for their social costs. 
 
With the debate over the desirability of business method patents raging stronger than ever 
(National Academies of Science 2004; Federal Trade Commission 2003), three new important 
cases reached the CAFC a decade later. This time, however, the CAFC rulings were appealed 
to the Supreme Court. In the first case, Bilski, in which a patent application for a hedge fund 
20 
 
business method had been refused by the USPTO,
24
 the CAFC dismissed the “useful, concrete 
and tangible result” test and replaced it by going back to the older “machine-or-
transformation” test.25 The CAFC went as far as to assert that the “machine-or-transformation” 
test is the sole legal standard to assess the patent-eligibility of processes (methods). In appeal, 
the Supreme Court upheld the CAFC’s dismissal of the “useful, concrete and tangible result” 
test, but rejected the CAFC’s affirmation that the sole test is “machine-or-transformation”.26 
Exemplifying this, the Court denied the patent under analysis without applying the “machine-
or-transformation” test, but simply—and vaguely—by affirming that the business method 
claimed therein was abstract. A majority of the Court also turned down a legal standard by 
which no business methods would have been eligible for patent, an outlook that would have 
reduced expectations of patent protection for business methods to zero. Compared to the 
situation prevailing after State Street, the end-result after Bilski was a higher threshold to 
obtain patents for computerized business methods—commensurate with lower expectations of 
patent protection for firms (see Figure 1). 
 
The situation evolved some more two years later, with the Mayo decision,
27
 in which a 
process patent to determine optimal drug dosage to healthcare patients was challenged. This 
business method was not computerized, but the case’s reasoning extends to all business 
method patent applications. The Supreme Court once again raised the threshold for patent-
eligibility of business methods, by now asserting that it was possible for a patent application to 
satisfy the “machine-or-transformation” test and yet not be patent-eligible. In practice, this 
conclusion made the “machine-or-transformation” test useless (Bruneau 2013). This time as 
well, the Court rejected the patent by pronouncing the business method to be an “abstract 
idea”. In doing so, it stressed the role of the utilitarian patent rationale for patent-eligibility to 
judge this kind of cases: courts should make sure that the fundamental building blocks of 
research and inventive activities remain free of appropriation (Bruneau 2013). In support of 
judges and patent examiners, the Court set out a two-step framework to determine when patent 
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  Bilski v Kappos, supra note 10. 
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  In re Bilski, 545 F 3d 943 (Fed Cir 2008). 
26
  Bilski v Kappos, supra note 10. 
27
  Mayo Collaborative Services v Prometheus Laboratories, Inc, supra note 8. 
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applications claim mere “laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas”. This 
framework was spelled out more explicitly in the 2014 Alice decision.
28
 In Alice, once again, a 
patent in the banking services industry was discarded in the pile of invalidated patents, the 
Court using this time the Mayo framework. Consequently, it confirmed if need be that the 
opinions and conclusions found in Mayo extended to computerized business methods. 
 
As a result of this trilogy of Supreme Court rulings, expectations of patent validity for 
computerized, as well as non-computerized, business methods decreased significantly 
compared to the same situation in the State Street era (see Figure 1). Short-term data show that 
the number of patent lawsuits filed subsequently to Alice (Barry et al 2015; Bessen 2014) and 
the number of business method patents issued during this same period both notably decreased 
(Bessen 2014). The upshot in the number of lawsuits is entirely due to changes in firms’ 
behaviour; so far, preliminary analyses trace the cause of this shift back to the Alice decision 
(Barry et al 2015; Bessen 2014). As for the decrease in the number of business method patents 
being issued, it likely results from a combined reaction of firms’ decisions—abandoning or 
modifying patent applications now expected to be rejected in the light of the Mayo 
framework—and of the USPTO, which responded to the Alice decision by tightening its 
guidelines to assess patent-eligibility in the course of patent examination (USPTO 2015). 
 
1.3 Extending the Scope of this Survey 
 
This chapter has illustrated how expectations of IP rights’ validity vary as a consequence 
of shifts in the legal environment, and how these fluctuations end up affecting firms’ 
decisions. The two contexts that were discussed focused on patents and on two specific 
industrial settings. In order to widen the spectrum of this paper and its economic model, the 
final section of this chapter reviews examples of past and potentially future legal shifts that 
have similar repercussions, albeit (1.3.1) without being confined to patents, and (1.3.2) 
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  Alice Corp v CLS Bank International, 134 Supreme Court Reporter 2347 (2014). 
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without being limited to industry-specific effects. Many of these potential shifts (1.3.3) relate 
to exceptional uses that do not amount to IP infringement. 
 
1.3.1 Stretching Technologies beyond their Inventive Dimension 
 
IP law offers a dual protection to computer programs, as they are copyrightable in 
addition to being potentially patentable.
29
 Unlike patent protection, which provides exclusion 
rights over the inventive features of computer programs, copyright protection is tethered to the 
programs’ codes as well as to their interfaces, in other words, to the many ways by which 
computer programs are expressed, either in words or images (Gervais and Judge 2011; Landes 
and Posner 2003). A computer program executing the exact, same function as another—
copyrighted—computer program, but expressed differently, would not infringe the copyright. 
A patent, on the other hand, would be violated by any computer program that executes the 
technical function claimed therein, whatever the ways the program is expressed. Even if the 
breadth of copyright protection is generally thought of as more limited than the protection 
conferred by patents, copyright still brings about numerous business benefits, particularly with 
respect to consumers (Phillips 2009; Dam 1995). Software users cannot legally copy it without 
the firm’s approval, typically through license, because copying the application also reproduces 
the inbred, copyrighted computer programs, an act that requires consent from the copyright-
holder.
30
. 
 
There existed a period, however, during which it was ambiguous whether computer 
programs benefited from copyright protection. In the United States, this grey area was 
clarified in the 1970s and 1980s through successive legal moves, combining court rulings, 
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  In Canada, Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42, section 2 “literary work” [Copyright Act]. In the United States, 
17 USC §101. In application of Article 10(1) of the TRIPS, supra note 5, Members of the WTO must provide 
copyright protection as literary works to computer programs, in both source code (human-readable 
instructions) and object code (the transformation of source code in a language that the machine can execute, 
usually binary). User interfaces are also copyrightable as “artistic work” under traditional copyright doctrine. 
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  In Canada, Copyright Act, ibid at sections 3, 27. In the United States, 17 USC §106, 501. 
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amendments to copyright law and the establishment by Congress of a commission to study 
interactions between copyright law and computer programs (Graham and Mowery 2003; Dam 
1995).
31
 At each of these steps, expectations of copyright protection grew for firms active in 
the software industry, encouraging them to increasingly exercise these rights, notably through 
the now ubiquitous license agreement (Phillips 2009). It is on account of bolstered 
expectations of copyright protection that firms and other participants in the software industry 
gained enough leverage to request their users and customers to agree to license agreements 
(Phillips 2009; Murray, Piper and Robertson 2014b). Copyright law was thence instrumental 
in enabling these participants, whether exclusionary market firms or F/OSS communities, to 
offer their products differently and exert more control over subsequent uses, hence, to find 
more ways to capture value for their technologies. 
 
Similar legal shifts happen (i) anytime the scope of an IP regime is extended to a new 
category of technologies, a situation that could occur should requirements for patent-eligibility 
be reduced; (ii) when sui generis regimes of IP are created for specific technologies, as has 
been the case in the 20
th
 century for plant varieties, integrated circuits and data required for 
market approval of pharmaceutical and agricultural products (Correa 2007); or (iii) when new 
categories of products are granted protection through geographical indications, i.e., 
designations that certify the origin of a product together with the singular quality or reputation 
that this origin conveys to consumers (Gervais 2012). 
 
From a Canadian perspective, compared with the country’s previous trade commitments 
and current regulations, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement, with countries of 
the European Union, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, with Australia, Brunei, Chile, Japan, 
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam, contain 
substantive provisions that, once ratified, shall increase the minimum protection to be 
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  Apple Computer, Inc v Franklin Computer, Corp, 714 F 2d 1240 (3d Cir 1983). As the final step in this legal 
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law. 
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accorded to data submitted for market approval of pharmaceutical and agricultural products, 
whether patented or not (Lexchin and Gagnon 2014).
32
 This increased legal protection should 
enhance firms’ expectations of temporary market exclusivity for these products. As the case of 
Myriad Genetics illustrates, market exclusivity in these industries can be accompanied by a 
significant commercial value. 
 
1.3.2 Changing the Terms of Intellectual Property 
 
In Canada, prior to January 1
st
, 1996, patent protection lasted seventeen years starting 
from the issuance date, subject to the payment of maintenance fees. In 1996, the term of 
protection switched to twenty years counting from the filing date.
33
 This change results from 
Canada accessing the World Trade Organization (“WTO”), because Members of the WTO 
have to comply with the organization’s diverse agreements, including article 33 of the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights. This provision 
enunciates that Members shall make patent protection available for at least twenty years 
starting from the filing date. Statutory patent law in the United States was similarly revised 
during the same period (Gallini 2002). 
 
In most cases, where the delay between filing and issuance amounted to less than three 
years, the term of protection of pending patents was basically extended.
34
 For these firms at 
that time, this statutory modification meant a longer patent term than what was coveted at first. 
For this additional period of patent protection coverage, expectations of validity prior to this 
amendment were nil, compared to the continuation of the firm’s regular expectations once the 
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  The (particularly convoluted) legal mechanics of these provisions are beyond the scope of this paper, and 
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  Patent Act, supra note 5 at sections 44, 46.  
34
  It is worth noting that the way Canada initially amended its legislation was—successfully—disputed at the 
WTO because applications still under review in 1996 were supposed to receive the old term of protection, 
which would be less than twenty years from filing for those pending patent applications that would be 
examined in less than three years. This dispute led to an amendment to section 45 of the Patent Act, supra 
note 5. See Canada—Term of Patent Protection (Complaint by the United States) (2000) WTO Doc 
WT/DS170/AB/R (Appellate Body Report), online: WTO <http://docsonline.wto.org>. 
25 
 
amendment was announced. This extension and its associated rise in expectations affected all 
patent applications in the same manner, indiscriminately of their industrial sectors, thus 
showing that occurrences of legal shifts can be de jure industry-neutral. Of course, this does 
not preclude the de facto industry-specific impacts of these shifts to differ. Should either the 
term or general scope of protection offered by any IP regime be extended or confined in the 
future, these changes should likewise affect all right holders. This situation is currently 
contemplated in Canada, where the government, in negotiations leading to the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, agreed to a twenty-year extension of the term of copyright protection.
35
  
 
1.3.3 Exceptions Are Everywhere 
 
The term of protection is not the only limitation to the exclusionary right conferred by IP 
law. Most IP regimes also specify various exceptions, which can by and large be regrouped in 
two sets: those qualifying the regime’s subject matter (validity), and those delineating the 
application (enforceability) of conferred titles. As has been examined through the analysis of 
patent-eligibility, many exceptions germane to subject matter refer to categories that are 
excluded from eligible protection. Similarly, it can be that an IP regime protects only some 
aspects of that subject matter while leaving other dimensions untouched. This phenomenon 
could be observed with respect to the difference between the copyrighted code of computer 
programs and the non-copyrightable functions executed by this code.
36
 For application, IP law 
regimes often detail a number of dealings that fall within the perimeter of exceptions. These 
exceptional uses are permitted and do not count as IP infringement. To conclude this chapter, 
two more examples of limitations in IP law regimes are introduced. Should their ambit be 
adjusted through court judgments or statutory amendments, they would dampen or boost 
firms’ expectations (i) of IP validity or (ii) of these rights’ enforceability. 
                                                          
35
  “Trans-Pacific Partnership: Text of the Trans-Pacific Partnership”, online: New Zealand Foreign Affairs & 
Trade <http://tpp.mfat.govt.nz/text>. Compare Chapter 18, Article 18.63 with Copyright Act, s. 6. Ratification 
of this trade agreement and amendments to the Copyright Act will be necessary for this extension to enter into 
force. 
36
  Jurists usually refer to this as the “idea/expression dichotomy”. 
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(i) Trademark law provides exclusion rights over the commercial use of distinctive marks 
and other signs that distinguish a firm’s goods and services from those of its 
competitors.
37
 From a technological point of view, there exists a conspicuous exception 
to the subject matter of trademark law: functional features. In most jurisdictions, 
exclusion rights granted to distinctive marks do not extend to any functional feature the 
mark may possess.
38
 LEGO blocks probably best illustrate this rule. People who grew 
up in North America or Europe instantly think “LEGO” when they see square 
construction bricks that can be piled together through circular studs. The legal 
definition of a trademark is without a doubt satisfied. Yet, these circular studs are 
functional, and therefore cannot be the object of trademark protection.
39
 The intention 
behind this exclusion is to avoid that trademark registration, with its potentially infinite 
duration,
40
 impairs the rationale behind the temporal limitedness of other IP regimes, 
namely patents, copyrights and industrial designs (Landes and Posner 2003; Gervais 
and Judge 2011). These finite terms of protection, as was evoked at the beginning of 
this chapter regarding patents, ensure that, in the long run, users can build on 
inventions, ideas and creations that have been disclosed in exchange for appropriate IP 
protection and that have since joined the public domain. This justification takes even 
more importance in the case of functions that have no adequate technological 
substitutes, like the round shape of a tire (Landes and Posner 2003); in these cases, the 
functional feature literally encompasses the technology’s “abstract idea”, which is 
explicitly left out of patent-eligibility in accordance with the patent rationale. Changes 
to this trademark limitation or to how it is applied may impact the decision-making 
processes of firms whose technologies come with distinctive, functional designs. 
                                                          
37
  In Canada, Trade-Marks Act, RSC 1985, c T-13, sections 2 “distinctive”, 2 “Trade-Mark”, 19 [Trade-Marks 
Act]. In the United States, 15 USC §1114, 1127 “trademark”. At the WTO, Articles 15-16 of the TRIPS, 
supra note 5, require that WTO members provide trademark protection to an extent at least comparable to this 
description. 
38
  In Canada, Trade-Marks Act, ibid at paragraph 13(2). In the United States, 15 USC §1052(e)(5). 
39
  Kirkbi AG v Ritvik Holdings Inc, [2005] 3 Supreme Court Reports 302. LEGO had patented its design in 
Canada and tried, after the patent’s expiration, to enforce common law trademark protection, to no avail. 
40
  In Canada, Trade-Marks Act, supra note 37 at sections 19, 46. In the United States, 15 USC §1058-59. For 
members of the WTO, this indefinite duration is required by the TRIPS, supra note 5 at Article 18. 
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(ii) In addition to numerous user exceptions, copyright regimes also ordinarily exempt 
from infringement a list of dealings gathered under the fair use doctrine, called “fair 
dealing” in Canada.41 This doctrine provides that some specific uses—among others, 
research, criticism, news reporting, satire and parody—are allowed if they are deemed 
“fair” according to legal or jurisprudential standards. In legal theory, rights are 
construed extensively, whereas exceptions are interpreted restrictively (Côté, Beaulac 
and Devinat 2011; Sullivan 2008), thereby generally confining users’ expectations of 
fair use admissibility. In turn, lower expectations of fair use entitlement are correlated 
with higher expectations of enforceability for copyright owners. In Canada, however, a 
major legal shift occurred in the realm of copyright law when the Supreme Court, in 
the early 2000s, affirmed that fair dealing should not be construed restrictively, as 
exceptions to copyright, but rather liberally, under a concurrent concept of “users’ 
rights”.42 In words comparable to those that the U.S. Supreme Court recites to discuss 
patent-eligibility, the impetus was to strike “a balance between promoting the public 
interest in the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and 
obtaining a just reward for the creator.”43 Users’ rights are thus justified by the 
imperative of promoting the dissemination of works; under the conditions of the fair 
dealing doctrine, this diffusion is presumed to produce benefits that dwarf creators’ 
reward losses. 
 
This interpretive distinction may sound arcane to non-jurists, making it difficult to 
figure out its concrete outcomes. Hopefully a real case will help to discern its 
implications. Under the fair dealing doctrine, it does not constitute copyright 
infringement for companies that operate online music services in Canada to provide 
30-to-90-second streaming extracts of songs in their catalogues, as these previews help 
                                                          
41
  In Canada, Copyright Act, supra note 29 at section 29. In the United States, 17 USC §107. 
42
  CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, [2004] 1 Supreme Court Reports 339 at paras 12, 48, 51, 
Chief Justice McLachlin. 
43
  Théberge v Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain inc, [2002] 2 Supreme Court Reports 336 at para 30, Justice 
Binnie, reaffirmed and cited in CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, ibid at para 23. 
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consumers “research” the music they desire.44 The fair dealing doctrine is stretched in 
two different directions here. First, had “research” been interpreted restrictively, as an 
exception, it is very unlikely that it could have encompassed activities that are much 
closer to trade consumption, like grocery store samples given to clients, than to 
research. Second, the parties invoking this defense (online music providers) were not 
the actual users involved in the fair dealings (consumers “researching” music); legal 
defenses predicated on the fair dealing doctrine first permitted this possibility only 
after the concept of “users’ rights” was first spelled out.45 As a consequence of this 
change in the fair dealing doctrine, Canadian firms partaking in technological sectors 
where firms regularly resort to copyright protection had to adapt their expectations of 
enforceability. Similar changes would occur should a jurisdiction bring equivalent 
modifications to the exceptions permitted by any legal regime of IP. Among others, 
patent law allows exceptional uses of patented inventions for purposes of research, 
scientific experiment or non-commercial use.
46
 As an exception, this defense is 
currently applied restrictively (Scotchmer 2004; Landes and Posner 2003; Gallini 
2002), but a legal shift that would apply it liberally instead could significantly impact 
firms’ expectations of patent enforceability. 
                                                          
44
  Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada v Bell Canada, [2012] 2 Supreme Court 
Reports 326. 
45
  CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada, supra note 42. 
46
  In Canada, Patent Act, supra note 5 at section 55.2(6). See also Smith, Kline & French Inter-American Corp v 
Micro-Chemicals Ltd, [1972] Supreme Court Reports 506. In the United States, this defense is not codified 
but rather originates from common law principles; see Madey v Duke University, 307 F 3d 1351 (Fed Cir 
2002). These exceptions are permitted in the WTO superstructure in the TRIPS, supra note 5 at Article 30. 
  
Chapter 2: On Distinguishing Inventions and Innovations 
 
Chapter 1 outlined the role of firms’ expectations of IP protection in their decision-
making processes for technology management and supported the motivation for focusing the 
analysis of this paper on changes in these expectations. Before setting out a microeconomic 
model to study the effects of legal shifts in firms’ choices, the subject of Chapter 3, it is 
imperative to first appraise how firms interact with IP rights. The accuracy of this assessment 
determines the soundness of the model’s structure and assumptions. 
 
2.1 Not Reinventing the Wheel, or the Innovation Process 
 
When investigating the role of IP in the technological realm, a common misconception 
consists in assimilating inventions to innovations. IP rights that apply to technologies cover 
inventions, “creat[ions] or design[s] ([of] something that has not existed before)” (Oxford 
Dictionaries). Inventing takes a technological idea and implements or applies it. These 
implementations or applications are the object of IP protection, while the underlying 
technological ideas remain in the public domain (Frischmann 2012). Maintaining ideas and 
other fundamental building blocks in the public domain allows other inventors to access them 
and build on them. Contrary to the mythological “spark of genius” that is often believed to 
qualify inventive endeavours, inventors actually use, combine, re-shape, re-configure and 
build on available and often state-of-the-art knowledge and tools (McGee 1995).
47
 With the 
help of IP law’s design, particularly the second prong of the patent rationale,48 the public 
domain ensures that a substantial amount and diversity of these building blocks stay at 
creators’ disposal.  
 
                                                          
47
  Thomas Edison famously put it as “Ten percent inspiration, ninety percent perspiration.” 
48
  See the beginning of Chapter 1. 
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As a Schumpeterian concept, innovating can be defined as “reducing an invention to 
practice and exploiting it commercially” (Scherer 1965, 165). It brings implementations or 
applications of technological ideas to market. Understood this way, it is easily apparent that 
invention is but an initial step within the innovation process. The end-result of the innovation 
process is an innovation, a market product, either good or service, that incorporates at least 
one inventive input.
49
 Inventions are necessary, but most of the time insufficient, for 
innovations to exist; while it can happen that an invention is by itself an innovation, most 
inventions need further combinations with other inputs in order to become viable and 
profitable market products, i.e., to be commercially exploited by rational firms. These 
miscellaneous inputs could include other inventions, designs, branding, data and other forms 
of information, tangible components ranging from basic tools to high-technology devices, and 
so forth. In the innovation process, the commercial product’s functional requirements are 
chosen, and the inputs and knowledge components needed to meet these requirements, as well 
as their appropriate or optimal configuration, are identified. To some extent, the steps required 
to transform an invention into an innovation are similar to those needed to invent in the first 
place, albeit at a different, more concrete, level of abstraction (Plotkin 2009). 
 
Microsoft Office Word (“Word”) 2007, the text-processing software on which this paper 
was typed,
50
 provides a good example of the innovation process. When initially released, it 
counted many inventive applications and design components that distinguished it from 
competing products, including earlier Word editions. Most of these new features could (back 
in 2007) be defined as inventions, but they likely conveyed little commercial prospects in and 
of themselves. However, when these multiple inventions were combined together, along with 
other already-known designs and technical inputs, with the intent of developing a new edition 
for this multi-purpose text-processing software, this commercially successful (Microsoft News 
Center 2007) innovative product was obtained.  
                                                          
49
  The nature of the market depends on the product: not all products are destined for the consumer market. 
Interestingly, in line with Nordhaus’ (1969) seminal formal analysis of patents, economic models of patents 
tend to analyze process inventions (actually process innovations) like machineries, not consumer products. 
50
  “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix [or update] it.” 
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For most industries, when in relation with technologies, IP rights do not cover innovations 
like Word 2007 (although they could), but these individual, new and inventive features 
integrated in innovations. It is therefore indirectly, though not trivially, that some 
ramifications of IP law regimes reach the post-invention stages of the innovation process. 
Models of intra- and extra-organizational interactions between firms’ inventive and innovative 
units differ significantly depending on whether these models approach IP as applying to 
inventions or to innovations—as conceptually defined herein, not as textually flagged by their 
authors. 
 
A contemporary to Schumpeter, Plant (1934) similarly distinguished making inventions 
from exploiting inventions, the equivalent herein of innovation, and he recognized that 
economic conditions, including IP law, could bring about contrasting stimuli for these two 
separate undertakings. He argued, for instance, that in harsh economic times firms could prefer 
exploiting (possibly immature) inventions and reaping their associated benefits now, instead of 
waiting later for the higher expected benefits of exploiting fully mature versions of the same 
inventions. This short-term focus, to answer pressing concerns, is likely to implicate a 
redirection of firms’ resources for making inventions to expenditures for exploiting inventions. 
Meanwhile, these same economic depressions might provide a new impulse for unemployed 
workers to invent, as tinkering comparatively looks more promising when the job market is 
sluggish than when it is vigorous. In the same way, in being a constitutive element of the 
economic conditions, IP regimes stimulate or hinder inventive and innovative endeavours 
differently. In addition, IP systems pull these activities toward technological directions that 
offer greater expectations of value capture, based on the structure and breadth of the legal 
protection (Plant 1934). 
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The main reason for these varying effects in incentives for invention and innovation is 
that the innovation process and its integrated invention counterpart have distinctive features 
despite their similar structures. Plant hinted at one of these particularities, revolving around 
the second set of uncertainty touched upon en passant in this paper’s introduction: uncertainty 
regarding the commercial significance of a technology.
51
 This uncertainty is markedly higher 
during inventive activities than during the subsequent stages of innovation, as the more the 
firm’s innovative product is developed, the clearer is the firm’s outlook of market conditions, 
especially demand. Adding IP management to this discussion and keeping in mind that IP in a 
technological context applies to inventions, it follows that firms take decisions regarding IP in 
a relatively more volatile context than would be the case if IP regimes pertained directly to 
innovations instead of as a side effect. This inversely proportional curb between the 
innovation’s development progression and uncertainty about the commercial prospects of that 
same innovative product partly explains why so many patented inventions never reach 
commercial exploitation and, symptomatically, why a significant proportion of renewal fees 
for maintaining patents are not paid, leading to these patents’ automatic forfeit (Bessen and 
Meurer 2008). 
 
This conceptual distinction between invention and innovation, and its importance, were 
well-understood by prominent economists of the twentieth century (Plant 1934; Schumpeter 
1976; Scherer 1965). Apparently, it became neglected the moment economists studying 
technological development diverted their analytical lens from conceptual to formal economics. 
Microeconomic theory tends to (mis)represent the market impact of technological IP rights 
with monopoly models that incorrectly circumscribe the effects of IP to granting exclusive 
rights on innovative products rather than exclusion rights on inventive inputs (e.g., Miceli 
2009; Carlton and Perloff 2008; Lemley and Shapiro 2005; Scotchmer 2004;
52
 Landes and 
                                                          
51
  See the Introduction. The phenomenon presented by Plant can be theorized under the idea that firms’ level of 
risk aversion is exacerbated in difficult economic conditions. They feel disutility coming from other sources 
of risk more acutely, and they will thus seek, ceteris paribus, to reduce these risks (tantamount to uncertainty) 
to a greater level than the one they would find optimal in times of greater prosperity. 
52
  The inclusion of Scotchmer (2004) deserves an explanation. Scotchmer’s excellent work, like others listed in 
this paragraph, takes into consideration the potential blocking effects of patents, which incorporate some 
impacts of the difference between invention and innovation. However, her models leave out key aspects of 
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Posner 2003; Tirole 1988). This misconception translates to many models of IP that focus on 
upstream technological research and development (e.g., Acemoglu, Bimpikis and Ozdaglar 
2011; Carlton and Perloff 2008; Scotchmer 2004; Tirole 1988). The propensity of this 
(over)simplification might have been influenced by its prevalence in earlier work assessing 
formally the optimal structure of the patent system (e.g., Nordhaus 1969; Scherer 1972;
53
 
Gilbert and Shapiro 1990;
54
 Klemperer 1990;
55
 Scotchmer 2004; Carlton and Perloff 2009). 
Inventors and innovators do not research and experiment out of thin air. As just mentioned, 
they depend on a substantial amount of knowledge components, tools and technological 
inputs, many of which, depending on their nature and on the norms of the industrial sector, 
may be covered by IP. These models attempt to identify the effects of IP regimes; yet, they 
focus entirely on IP’s incidental reach on innovations and miss any insight incoming wholly 
from IP as an incentive or disincentive to inventive activities per se. Upstream, by overlooking 
the innovation process and its interplay with potentially IP-protected inventive inputs, these 
models understate the consequences of IP on the costs, revenues and overall opportunities 
specifically associated with the inventions emerging from the research and experimentation 
stages. Downstream, they limit their analysis to IP’s role in the commercial exploitation of 
innovative market products, as if the inherent inventive inputs were immune to market impetus 
in firms’ decision-making processes.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
this distinction, particularly the one just described with respect to uncertainty in commercial significance. 
Patents affect these distinctive features differently, and a satisfying model should capture these distinguishing 
effects: see Chapter 3 for more details. 
53
  Scherer is well aware of the distinction between invention and innovation, as exemplified by the fact that he 
scrupulously writes “inventors and innovators” in this (1972) article. Nonetheless, the model therein expands 
on Nordhaus’ (1969) formal work, which assimilates inventors and innovators. Consequently, Scherer’s 
article carries this pitfall. 
54
  In their conclusive remarks at 112, Gilbert and Shapiro acknowledge their model’s shortcomings in that 
respect. 
55
  Klemperer’s (1990) model differs from the others in that it recognizes that a firm’s innovation is but a point in 
the breadth of exclusivity given by a patent. In this way, his model does take into consideration that patents in 
themselves do not cover market products. Yet, this work studies patents’ market repercussions only, by 
considering that a firm’s patent excludes a number of substitute innovations circumscribed by the patent’s 
breadth, while innovations outside that breadth remain as potentially competing (substitute) market 
innovations. Unlike most models in this paragraph, Klemperer’s substitutability-minded approach accurately 
addresses IP as exclusion rights instead of exclusive (monopoly) rights. However, by focusing wholly on the 
innovation’s market impact, his model carries the same shortcoming as the other listed here, unable to 
appropriately distinguish inventions from innovations as it fails to capture important effects of IP, for 
instance, through licensing. 
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In the model put forward in Chapter 3, the importance of differentiating inventions from 
innovations is addressed by exploring a recent approach in technology management, open 
innovation, an organizational structure in which firm boundaries are purposively kept open in 
a way that facilitates inflows and outflows of knowledge and technologies (Chesbrough 2003). 
Firms in a growing number of industrial environments routinely adopt and internalize 
strategies that match this management model (Vanhaverbeke, Chesbrough and West 2014). 
The initial impression left by these tendencies has been sufficiently striking for governments 
and international organizations to dedicate special attention to better understand mechanisms 
of open innovation, their attributes, their effects and their potential (European Commission 
2014; Conseil de la science et de la technologie du Québec 2009; OECD 2008).  
 
Open innovation is adopted to represent some assumptions of this paper’s model, with 
respect to the industrial environment, because (i) of its latent theoretical differentiation 
between inventions and innovations; and (ii) of the relative simplicity by which ideas essential 
to open innovation can be amalgamated with microeconomic theory to naturally construct a 
model that distinguishes inventions and innovations. As open innovation theory initially 
stemmed from actual practices, successes and failures, the phenomena described and predicted 
by a model of microeconomic theory that is predicated on assumptions of open innovation 
should translate more easily to real-life explanations and examples. In order to build on these 
characteristics in the next chapter’s model, open innovation is described in the last section of 
this chapter. But first, to clarify why open innovation turns out to be a pertinent innovation 
theory, this chapter’s next section analyzes and elaborates on Baldwin and Von Hippel’s 
(2010) viability model. 
 
2.2 Why Open Innovation, in One Word: Viability 
 
Baldwin and Von Hippel’s (2010) work on the viability of innovation modes underscores 
the reasons behind open innovation’s quick rise in influence and its adoption by many in the 
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early 2000s (Villaroel 2013). These researchers compare the conditions of viability coupled 
with three modes of innovation: 
- Single-user innovation, tautologically, is created by one user for the satisfaction 
obtained from the innovation process and from one’s personal, customized use of the 
innovation (Von Hippel 1988; 2005; Piller and West 2014); 
- Producer innovation is the typical innovation produced by a firm for profit through 
market release. For its production process, the firm reckons on its internal innovation 
capabilities, with inventive contributions usually stemming from paid employees; and 
- Open-collaborative innovation is conceptualized as a group of people who share their 
ideas to each other openly and freely, as exemplified in F/OSS projects (Lakhani 
2013; Raymond 1999). Besides having access to the innovation achieved as an end-
result, participants can benefit in many ways from this cooperation—enjoying the 
process itself, acquiring new skills, learning from others or signaling their own skills, 
to name a few (Lakhani 2013; Baldwin and Von Hippel 2010; West and Gallagher 
2006). (It is important to note that, despite the resembling terminology, this 
conception of open-collaborative innovation is not synonymous with open innovation 
(Chesbrough and Bogers 2014).) 
 
In this description, in order to stress once more the importance of distinguishing 
inventions from innovations, particular attention has been given to the reasons that may incite 
inventive participants to partake in each of these three innovation modes. These participants 
may have multiple motivations, so they can choose to engage in more than one of these 
modes, even for competing innovations. In software development, this reality is eminently 
recognized as a large number of employed ICT professionals also devote some of their time to 
F/OSS projects (Lakhani 2013; Phillips 2009). 
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In Baldwin and Von Hippel’s (2010) model, the viability zones of these three modes of 
innovation are schematized over an x-y axis (Figure 2). The x-axis estimates an innovation 
project’s design costs, associated with the costs of identifying an innovation’s functional 
requirements and of finding the knowledge components and inputs needed to satisfyingly 
solve these functional requirements through a judicious arrangement. The y-axis gauges the 
project’s communication costs, which account for the costs of sharing design-related 
information among participants of the innovation process. The viability of each mode for any 
given innovation is captured by this graph.  
 
 
 
An innovation mode is said to be viable if its value for the innovator as well as for each 
innovative participant exceeds each of their concomitant individual costs. For the single-user 
and open-collaborative modes, the value is relatively small, as it sums up to the participants’ 
personal benefits derived from the innovation process, including access to and use of the 
innovation for oneself. Producer innovators have access to potentially greater value as they 
seek to make profits by offering the innovative product on the market, but they do so with 
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additional costs—for production and transactions—that the other two modes are not subject to. 
As the term suggests, production costs represent the costs of producing multiples copies of the 
innovation for market. Transaction costs are more intricate, as they account for the costs of 
securing rights or market power over the innovation and transacting with clients (Baldwin and 
Von Hippel 2010). Analyzing this graph shows how the deepening presence of ICT in 
innovation processes profoundly affected these three innovation modes and their viability 
zones (Baldwin and Von Hippel 2010). To observe these changes, one must first assess how 
these zones are bounded. 
 
The single-user innovator being, well, alone, no communication costs are incurred during 
the innovation process. However, its design costs escalate rapidly because of the difficulty for 
a single user to possess the wherewithal necessary to solve any complex design. Therefore, 
single-user innovation is algebraically viable when the user’s personal value ( U
iV ) for the 
innovation project i is higher than the innovation’s design costs (di), the only category of costs 
affecting single-user innovators.
56
 The viability zone of single-user innovation is thus defined 
by di ≤ 
U
iV , which is graphically represented by a vertical line close to the y-axis (Baldwin 
and Von Hippel 2010). For any innovation project whose coordinates of design and 
communication costs fall in this zone, single-user innovation is a viable mode. 
 
Open-collaborative innovation can attract a large number of actors willing to participate 
freely. This way, they can solve very complex design problems with virtually no design 
costs.
57
 Nevertheless, with any large number of participants from diverse geographical 
                                                          
56
  The elements of this mathematical notation come from Baldwin and Von Hippel (2010), with some 
simplification to focus on the aspects pertinent to this section’s purpose of underscoring the relevance of open 
innovation. This notation should not be mixed up with the one used for this paper’s model in Chapter 3. 
57
  Baldwin and Von Hippel (2010) specify that this simplification is applicable only when tasks in the 
innovation process are dividable into modules. This way, individual participants are not actually involved in 
the design work, for which, as was discussed regarding single-user innovators, costs grow fast. Seen from this 
perspective, virtually is the key word. In this layout, the innovator’s design costs for a modular innovation can 
be fixed upfront. Consequently, they can be pre-deducted from the open-collaborative innovator’s value, O
iV , 
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locations, communication costs, prior to the major advancement in ICT these last decades, 
would rise exponentially and quickly reach the point where they become unmanageable. 
Employing a notation equivalent to the one referred to for single-user innovation, open-
collaborative innovation is viable anytime the total value ( O
iV ) derived by the participants to 
the innovation project i is higher than the project’s costs, here solely constituted of 
communication costs (ci). Accordingly, and symmetrically to the single-user innovator, the 
viability zone of open-collaborative innovation is defined by ci ≤ 
O
iV , which is traced in 
Figure 2 as a horizontal line near the x-axis (Baldwin and Von Hippel 2010). 
 
Producer innovators have the opportunity of selling their innovative products to 
customers, and so, supported by expected market revenues, they are likely to find more value 
for their innovations. Compared with the other two modes, these revenues provide producer 
innovators with greater means to counterbalance costs, whether design costs, communication 
costs or a combination thereof. However, offering the innovation to customers also entails 
production and transaction costs. Despite these additional expenses, there remains a wide 
range of innovations for which expected revenues net of production and transaction costs are 
high enough to incur substantial design and communication costs. For any innovation project 
i, producer innovation is viable if the expected revenues P
iV  are higher than the sum of all 
costs—production (pi), transaction (ti), design (di) and communication (ci). In Figure 2’s 
layout, producer innovation is viable so long as di + ci ≤ 
P
iV  – pi – ti. The right-hand side of 
this inequality represents the producer innovator’s budgetary constraint, its expected revenues 
net of production and transaction costs. In Figure 2, the diagonal line delineates the viability 
zone of producer innovators, where this budgetary constraint equals the sum of an 
innovation’s intrinsic design and communication costs (Baldwin and Von Hippel 2010). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
instead of being assigned a positive amount of costs. O
iV  should thus be defined as the open-collaborative 
innovator’s value net of the costs necessary to set up the modular design. 
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Achieving a given innovation project entails specific design and communication costs, 
whose amounts determine the coordinates of this project in Figure 2’s graph. This position in 
turn indicates the mode(s), if any, that is(are) viable to carry out the innovation. As is visible 
in Figure 2, each of these modes is the only viable process under some circumstances. For 
instance, projects that require design and communication costs that are both non-trivial are 
only viable through producer innovation, if viable at all. Also apparent is that, in many cases, 
two or three modes viably compete or coexist for the same innovation. 
 
Now, what happens to this initial innovative environment when the quality of ICT 
increases by leaps and bounds, and these technologies become widely available at reasonable 
costs, a shock that occurred during the 1990s (Foray 2004; Castells 2001) and that has lingered 
in thereafter? On the one hand, effects of ICT improvements on production and transaction 
costs are mixed. Whereas digital innovations can be (re)produced cheaply (Baldwin and Von 
Hippel 2010; Phillips 2009), and producers of tangible innovations have greater access to a 
global ecosystem to manufacture their innovations at lower costs (Tseng 2013), transaction 
costs remain mostly unaffected. On the other hand, telecommunications and the internet 
permit global, large-scale and deep communications and information sharing at very low costs. 
Likewise, equipped with powerful search engines, web browsers provide free or inexpensive 
access to a broad range of ideas and designs to help individuals solve various complex 
problems, for example, with online discussion forums (Piller and West 2014). Thanks to 
contemporary ICT, innovation processes are subject to considerably less communication and 
design costs, possibly widening to the same extent the number of innovation modes for which 
they are viable. Graphically, the location of each individual innovation project in Figure 2 is 
pulled, to some varying extent, toward the origin (Villaroel 2013). The magnitude of this pull 
depends on each project’s functional requirements. The outcome is that many innovation 
projects that were previously unviable are now within reach, and a large number of projects 
that could only be undertaken viably with one mode now fall in zones where more than one 
mode is viable. 
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Single-user and open-collaborative innovators are markedly favoured by these changes, as 
design and communication costs respectively constitute their only constraints. Producer 
innovators see their costs diminish too, but unlike the other two, they also have to take into 
account production and transaction costs, thereby nibbling the comparative advantages they 
derive from contemporary technological improvements. Besides, the pull materialized by the 
advancements in ICT brings unexpected competition to many producer innovators whose 
innovation projects were positioned close to the bounds of viability of the other two modes, 
which are likely now viable for these same innovation projects. For a few given innovation 
projects, it is even possible that innovators from these emerging viable modes can develop the 
innovation at lower costs than those of producer innovators.  
 
In this scenario, producer innovators that do not react are likely to suffer unless their 
innovations are unaffected by ICT or entail hefty design as well as communication costs. 
Producers can respond to improvements in ICT by learning greater flexibility. Among other 
means, flexibility can surface when producer innovators become hybrids that integrate 
processes, participants and inputs from the other two modes of innovation into their own 
innovation processes, in cases where it is indeed more profitable to do so (Baldwin and Von 
Hippel 2010). For instance, crowdsourcing (Villaroel 2013; Füller, Hutter and Hautz 2013) is 
a hybrid innovation process in which a producer innovator relies on collaborative practices to 
harness ideas and knowledge components from community participants traditionally alien to 
the producer innovator (Baldwin and Von Hippel 2010). As flexibility allows them to reorient 
their activities better and faster, hybrids are more likely to have a higher hand in current 
industrial ecosystems, where the penetration and performance of ICT are ever intensifying. 
Even the most hegemonic company of the 1990s, Microsoft, chose to adapt its processes to 
this reality, and it did so expressly by embracing practices and norms of open innovation to 
reach out to innovators from other modes (Phelps and Kline 2009). 
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Henry Chesbrough’s seminal book on open innovation, written in 2003, was not meant 
exclusively for an academic public, but also for firm managers (Chesbrough and Bogers 
2014). It was a sensible move on his part: the evidence collected to set up the concept of open 
innovation was deeply grounded in the empirical examination of technology management 
practices, from important firms (Xerox, IBM, Intel, Procter & Gamble, Lucent) evolving in 
various industrial ecosystems (software, hardware, semiconductors, consumer goods). It thus 
made sense to engage from the start with people positioned on the first line to actively respond 
to a publication structured in a way that amalgamates management and business practices and 
views into a theory that would then be coined “open innovation”. The open innovation 
approach is undergirded by practice. If truth is to be found in the value-maximizing 
assumption of microeconomic theory, then it must follow that the pre-2003 adoption of these 
practices and views resulted from an adaptation to transformed conditions in the industrial 
setting, which made these practices comparatively more profitable than before. 
Retrospectively, with Baldwin and Von Hippel’s work in mind, open innovation constitutes 
one way by which producer firms can hybridize their innovation processes and integrate new 
processes, participants and knowledge components in a technological environment that 
warrants it for firms to keep vying for market success and value. 
 
2.3 How Open Innovation Innovates 
 
Open innovation is defined as “a distributed innovation process based on purposively 
managed knowledge flows across organizational boundaries, using pecuniary and non-
pecuniary mechanisms in line with each organization’s business model” (Chesbrough and 
Bogers 2014, 27). To go over and contextualize each of the components of this definition, the 
open innovation funnel (Figure 3, taken from Chesbrough and Bogers 2014, 18), which is 
profusely referred to in open innovation literature, shall be relied on. 
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Open innovation is predicated on the idea that knowledge in industrial environments is 
widely dispersed (Hayek 1945; Chesbrough 2003), a starting point that is particularly relevant 
in today’s globalized markets. Not coincidentally, this starting point converges with the 
foregoing analysis, which emphasized the role of ICT in the rise of open innovation as a 
pertinent and viable management model. Market globalization has itself been sparked by the 
increasing performance and adoption of ICT since they facilitated and accentuated movements 
of workers, technologies and capital (Barney 2004; Chesbrough 2003; Castells 2001), each of 
which encompasses and carries knowledge components. In Figure 3’s funnel, this distribution 
of knowledge is principally portrayed by the division of knowledge bases on the left-hand 
side: the firm (the dotted funnel) is aware of, and internalizes, some of that basic knowledge, 
but an important part of it lies outside the firm.  
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Should a firm be closed—meant as the opposite of open—it would be represented by a 
hard-line funnel. Unlike firms practicing open innovation, closed firms are not permeable to 
external knowledge. Accordingly, they cannot benefit from the inclusion of external 
knowledge in their own innovation processes and innovative market products. Firms that find 
more and better ways to absorb external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) and that 
recognize this knowledge’s potential are more likely to offer superior technological products, 
and to achieve equivalent results faster and less expensively than closed competitors can do 
(Bessant and von Stamm 2013; Christensen 2006). To refer to the terminology used in the 
previous section, this potential upshot represents the advantages for a producer firm to 
hybridize its innovation process, by allowing it to access innovations that are unviable through 
strictly “closed” producer innovator mechanisms,58 and to achieve already-viable innovations 
in potentially more efficient ways, for instance, by outsourcing some parts of the innovation 
process. The significance of opening the innovation process is enhanced in industries where 
competition takes place for a large part on the advance and quality of technological offerings, 
such as the computing and software industries (Saxenian 1994). 
 
Contrary to the impressions the term may evoke, open innovation does not boil down to 
entirely opening the innovation process. If the closed innovation paradigm amounts to erecting 
walls around the innovation process, open innovation simply installs doors in these walls. 
Once these doors are operational, it is up to the firm to decide which doors to open and which 
doors to keep locked. For every door, these two options ought to vary over time, based on the 
firm’s strategies and business model (Vanhaverbeke and Chesbrough 2014; Möslein 2013). 
The scenario of a firm razing the walls is but one way for a firm to practice open innovation. 
Taking up open innovation does not work as a management panacea, and neither should it be 
seen that way: it offers extra and different opportunities, and it fosters fresh strategic responses 
in industrial environments where some elements of open innovation are espoused, but it does 
not guarantee that these new opportunities and strategies are better or more efficient than those 
that previously existed and that remain applicable. Furthermore, the firm still has to manage 
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  In Figure 3, the zones where only single-user or open-collaborative innovators are viable. 
44 
 
this openness efficiently, failing which, open innovation might end up hurting the firm 
(Vanhaverbeke, Chesbrough and West 2014). 
 
Fully coherent with the way innovation is conceptualized in this paper, and in line with 
the previous section’s discussion, inputs in the innovation process (the individual circles in 
Figure 3) are the elements that help solving the functional and market requirements needed to 
design the end-innovation. They are inherently knowledge components. The production and 
marketing processes, which bring innovative products to customers, often involve non-
knowledge inputs, but knowledge components are sufficient for the innovation process. 
However, as Figure 3 shows, the production (manufacturing) and marketing processes overlap 
with the innovation process and, through dynamic interactions, may add new knowledge 
components to the innovation process. There is an aspect particularly interesting for this 
paper’s distinction between inventions and innovations that has received only scattered 
attention so far in open innovation literature: through the open innovation process, knowledge 
as a whole—represented by the sum of all the knowledge components (circles) in Figure 3—is 
a shapeshifter. It takes different forms depending on the stage of the innovation process (the 
timeline arrows at the bottom of Figure 3). As a consequence, a “one-size-fits-all” efficient 
solution in managing all of the firm’s knowledge components is unlikely. 
 
Early in the innovation process, most of the knowledge involved is composed of pure or 
basic knowledge. As mentioned above, by excluding “laws of nature, natural phenomena and 
abstract ideas”, legal standards of patent-eligibility and other features of IP regimes usually 
ensure that these pools of basic knowledge cannot be appropriated (Frischmann 2012). The 
distinction between internal and external knowledge bases (on the left-hand side of Figure 3) 
is therefore mainly determined by a firm’s capabilities at absorbing knowledge (Cohen and 
Levinthal 1990), while appropriation considerations are mostly ignored. Then, as research and 
experimentation activities are being conducted in the firm, either more basic knowledge is 
begotten, or some basic knowledge is applied for various implementations (Frischmann 2012; 
Fabrizio 2006). At some level of abstraction, activities that yield either basic or applied 
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knowledge can be conceptually integrated under the umbrella of research. Referring to 
econometric measurements, Frischmann (2012) distinguishes basic from applied research 
through the variances in commercial uses that are expected of the firm’s research agendas—a 
higher variance in the case of basic research, as it can lead to a myriad of unforeseen 
implementations. Frischmann’s approach thence distinguishes both types of research not 
through the conventional but inaccurate binary dichotomy, but with a continuum. The implicit 
uncertainty behind variance assessments is closer to how research is achieved in reality,
59
 
especially once it is acknowledged that firms are usually uncertain about the commercial 
prospects of their inventions and innovations.  
 
When research activities bring forth applied knowledge, the firm is updated about ways 
by which basic knowledge can be implemented, potentially in commercial applications 
(Landes and Posner 2003). This applied knowledge typically consists of inventions, protected 
by IP rights or not depending on the firm’s strategies and business model (Chesbrough and 
Ghafele 2014). In turn, these factors depend on the effectiveness and availability of 
appropriation instruments, and on the mechanisms by which the firm can best use its assets to 
tap into the value of these inventions (Teece 1986). 
 
Next, in the development stage, knowledge components exist under the form of 
innovations. By combining inventive implementations with other components, innovations 
convey technical knowledge on how their inbred elements of basic and applied knowledge 
interact with a number of technical settings. For instance, Word 2007 works differently 
depending on the operating system of the device it is installed on. As a result, its technical 
interactions with other software applications and with the device’s overall design are more or 
less convenient and efficient. This knowledge matters to many people involved: Microsoft 
itself as the firm that markets Word 2007, customers, firms that offer competing products, 
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  See Chesbrough (2003) for numerous examples of innovations developed by corporate research units whose 
missions were actually to invent. 
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firms like computer manufacturers that incorporate Word 2007 in their innovations or 
products, firms that use Word 2007 as a tool in their own activities, and the list goes on.  
 
New layers of knowledge, assembly knowledge, are created similarly at the manufacturing 
stage. There, the previous forms of knowledge interact with various production settings, which 
include, depending on the technical backdrop, designs, materials, digital formats, and logistics 
processes such as platforms (Tseng 2013). Finally, the whole length of Figure 3 represents the 
innovation process up to market, the result of which is an innovative market product. At this 
point, commercial knowledge is generated as at least three separate streams of information 
simultaneously travel back to the firm. First, customer reactions to the innovation’s market 
presence carry information about its commercial value, a critical factor in firms’ decision-
making processes about the innovation and its inventive input(s). Second, the firm receives 
information about the nature of the actual use(s) made of the product; technological history 
abounds with cases of innovative products that have not been adopted for the purposes they 
were intended for (Barney 2004). This second stream of information may have a tremendous 
impact, positive or negative, on knowledge informed by the first stream. Third, the market 
response, particularly from lead users, indicates future technological needs, desires and 
upcoming trends in relation with the innovative product (Von Hippel 2005). This stream sends 
important signals for firms’ subsequent or affiliated innovation processes. 
 
Of course, the order of this sequence is simplistic (empirically, see Shah and Mody (2014) 
for entrepreneurial cases), and this description of a straight innovation process is increasingly 
disrupted by strategies of open innovation. As an example, through openness, it is easier and 
thus more common for firms to offer beta or incomplete versions of their innovations to users, 
particularly key clients, in order to receive partial commercial knowledge at the development 
stage (Möslein 2013; Bessant and von Stamm 2013). 
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Each time an open firm learns about the formation of new knowledge, either from the 
inside or from the outside of its boundaries, it can strategically adjust its innovation process. 
Most of these adjustment decisions happen through knowledge flows, which allow knowledge 
components to cross the firm’s walls, through one of their doors (Chesbrough 2003; 
Chesbrough and Bogers 2014). These flows can take place at any stage of the innovation 
process and hence can carry any of the aforementioned forms of knowledge. Flows can move 
knowledge outside-in (inbound), inside-out (outbound), or they can be coupled (Enkel, 
Gassmann and Chesbrough 2009; Chesbrough and Bogers 2014). In Figure 3, they are 
represented by the arrows. In practice many of them are manifested by contracts. Each type of 
flows can be managed through a variety of different relationships and means, depending on 
the firm’s business model (Vanhaverbeke and Chesbrough 2014; Chesbrough 2006a). Inbound 
flows can be incarnated by licensing-in external knowledge components; buying IP assets; 
actively searching for knowledge; investing in start-ups; spin-ins, mergers and acquisitions; 
collaboration with partners like customers, universities and suppliers; crowdsourcing and 
contests; and so forth. Conversely, out-licensing, spin-offs, funding start-ups, donations, 
assignments of IP assets and joint ventures typically characterize outbound flows (Chesbrough 
and Bogers 2014). Coupled flows involve a mutual transfer of knowledge components, such as 
can be found in joint ventures, strategic alliances or platform launches (Gassmann and Enkel 
2004; Piller and West 2014). In this paper’s model, coupled flows are not explicitly examined. 
Instead, they are simplified as a combination of inbound and outbound flows, which are both 
formally analyzed in the model. 
 
Through knowledge flows, a firm may be able (1) to enhance the value of its innovative 
products, (2) to capture some value in other firms’ innovative products or (3) to launch 
innovative and valuable products that would not have existed otherwise.
60
 At first sight, it may 
look like these three sources of value respectively capture the advantages arising from 
inbound, outbound and coupled flows of knowledge (see, e.g., O’Connor’s (2010) description 
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  An account of the ways by which each of the practices mentioned in the previous paragraph may increase the 
value captured by a firm for its inventions and innovations is beyond the scope of this paper. Readers 
interested in such a description are directed to this section’s references for open innovation, especially to 
Chesbrough (2003 and 2006a). 
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of in- and out-licensing), but this perception misses the complex ramifications of firms’ 
strategies. The case of IBM illustrates this point. 
 
Following major losses in the early 1990s, IBM re-oriented its business model from 
hardware, PC and computer mainframe manufacturing toward high-level information 
technology services (Chesbrough 2003). Unlike its main competitors in this new market, 
which relied on proprietary and exclusionary solutions, IBM focused on F/OSS solutions 
around the Linux operating system and the Java programming language, which were—and 
still are—used as preeminent software platforms (Phillips 2009). Had IBM subscribed to a 
narrow outlook of the role of knowledge flows, it would have supported value creation in its 
new business model with inbound flows, like obtaining licences to inputs that improve IBM’s 
offerings, hiring talented F/OSS developers, acquiring prominent firms involved in F/OSS and 
so forth. Instead, these inbound mechanisms ended up being incidental among IBM’s massive 
expenditures in the external development of free and open source standards through IP 
donations, direct investments in the Linux Foundation, out-licensing and spin-out research 
projects (West and Gallagher 2006; Phillips 2009). In short, for value creation in its 
information technology services, IBM mainly relied on outbound flows. With this strategy, 
IBM ensured that F/OSS applications would remain at the leading edge of information 
technology product offerings. Combining this advantage with F/OSS being technically free,
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many organizations worldwide adopted F/OSS solutions. In turn, the more organizations opted 
for them, the more IBM enjoyed positive network externalities and profitably entrenched its 
business model for expert information technology services oriented toward F/OSS applications 
(Phillips 2009). 
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  That F/OSS software itself is free does not mean that the adoption of F/OSS solutions is costless. Software 
must be installed and updated, some programs require customization, and employees need to be trained, 
among other costly services. 
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As the case of IBM hints, providing one’s firm with learning capabilities is crucial within 
the open innovation mindset, since the firm cannot make any strategic adjustment if it does not 
know about these new opportunities (O’Connor 2006). IBM could not have converted its 
business model toward information technology services if it had not previously perceived the 
ascending importance of F/OSS and foreseen the concomitant organizational demand for high-
quality information technology services. For inbound knowledge flows, an open firm ought to 
be mindful of the existence of external knowledge components and of their latent blooming 
value should these components be integrated in the firm’s internal innovation processes. For 
outbound knowledge flows, the firm should stay aware of partners that could be interested in 
its knowledge components or, alternatively, spread information to the industrial environment 
that signals the internal knowledge components that the firm possesses, and for which it 
considers outbound knowledge flows.
62
 Internally, when firms are sufficiently large and 
decentralized, this need for learning capabilities encourages the creation of channels of 
communications between a firm’s units, and kindling team spirit and cooperation within and 
between these units (Doz 2013; Phelps and Kline 2009). Externally, it stresses the importance 
of creating and maintaining networks through a myriad of individually-tailored ties in the 
business ecosystem, which includes industry associations, universities, investors, 
governmental institutions, start-ups, suppliers, customers, firms from complementary markets, 
competitors and any other relevant partner (Simard and West 2006; Saxenian 1994). 
 
The type of relationship associated with these external links should differ based on the 
level of articulation of the knowledge components at stake. In absolute terms, a knowledge 
component is either tacit or articulate (Polanyi 1958). Whereas articulate knowledge is limpid, 
somewhat easy to understand and can be transmitted effortlessly, tacit knowledge is difficult 
to convey, even with verbal or written-down explanations (Polanyi 1958). Skills, know-how 
and technical expertise are typically listed as tacit knowledge (Bruneau 2013). Concretely, 
however, knowledge articulation is not absolute, but relative, as it depends on the other 
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  This alternative comes at the risk of short-sightedness: the focal firm may incorrectly evaluate the industrial 
sectors that could be interested in the knowledge component it signals. Basic knowledge components, for 
which commercial prospects and possibilities are more uncertain and variable, are particularly prone to this 
myopia. 
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person’s familiarity with the field. For example, when an economist wishes to convey all the 
insights gathered from an economic model to someone who has never learned calculus, 
meticulous work of popularization must be slogged through, while these same results can be 
grasped by other economists simply by showing them the maths. In the former case, the 
knowledge component is tacit for the economist’s vis-à-vis, while the same knowledge 
component is generally articulate for experienced economists. This relativist standard also 
occurs for a large portion of knowledge components in the innovation process.
63
 For instance, 
computer programmers articulate most of their applied and technical knowledge through 
coding languages, easily readable by other computer programmers who mastered these 
languages, but hardly understandable for the lay public (Bruneau 2013; Plotkin 2009). Tacit 
knowledge can yet be handed over, but this sharing either requires more efforts to aptly 
convey the knowledge component, typically in a master-apprentice relationship (Polanyi 
1958), or necessitates pre-steps of articulation—e.g., learning calculus or code languages. In 
both ways, transferring (relatively) tacit knowledge involves additional costs, often through 
supplementary efforts, that hinder tacit knowledge’s potential diffusion and make it more 
“sticky” (Von Hippel 1994).  
 
The extra costs necessary for the transmission of tacit knowledge are more likely to be 
committed under some relational circumstances. First, when both the transferor and the 
transferee partake in the same technological sector, geographical area, or both, it is probable 
that commonalities in their cultural and technological environments partially or fully pre-
articulate tacit knowledge components. Furthermore, when two partners are strongly 
connected, the strength of a tie being characterized by the frequency and regularity of its 
activations (Simard and West 2006), the vis-à-vis is more consciously cognizant of the 
benefits it gets from this bond. This awareness raises the firm’s willingness to undertake a 
burdensome transfer or articulation that participates in sustaining the good relationship. In the 
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  An astonishing instantiation of this phenomenon took place in the Myriad Genetics case discussed in 
Section 1.1. Despite being presented expert evidence and having access to all the necessary documents 
expounding the scientific and technical background of the patents challenged therein, one Supreme Court 
judge declared in his concurring opinion that he was “unable to affirm those details on [his] own knowledge 
or even [his] own belief.” See Association for Molecular Pathology v Myriad Genetics, Inc, supra note 18 at 
2120, Justice Scalia. 
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same vein, strong ties foster trust (Simard and West 2006), a characteristic also found in 
business relations maintained by repeated formal contracts (Brousseau, Lyarskaya and Muniz 
2010). In a network tie, trust increases a firm’s confidence that it will be satisfyingly 
compensated when it consents to (articulation) efforts that inure to the other party’s benefits. 
 
This relational context brings attention to the only part of the open innovation definition 
that has not been scrutinized yet: open innovation is a purposive mode of management. When 
firms’ decision-makers follow an innovation process characteristic of open innovation, they do 
so because they believe it will produce positive outcomes for the firm; in the jargon of 
microeconomic theory, because they expect these practices to maximize the value that the firm 
can capture from its technologies. For the model herein, this purposive management of 
knowledge flows allows it to replicate value-optimizing principles of microeconomic theory. 
Some industries, such as ICT and biotechnologies, have extensively—and often consciously 
(Chesbrough and Bogers 2014)—adopted mechanisms of open innovation (Gassmann, Enkel 
and Chesbrough 2010). An assumption of openness, where every firm’s value-optimizing 
procedure takes into account the benefits and costs of knowledge flows otherwise left in 
abeyance, appears reasonable for modeling these industrial settings. The model is now ready 
to be laid bare, a task with which the next chapter has been entrusted. 
 
  
Chapter 3: Modeling IP Legal Shifts 
 
This chapter begins by configuring the model (3.1), namely, the variables and parameters 
that define firms’ cost and revenue structures. At the core of the model lies a tension between 
two technology management mechanisms: IP protection and secrecy. Because of interactions 
between firms’ technology management decisions and their expected values, the model 
includes a game theoretic component.  
 
Once the model’s terms are set, general multi-firm applications are achieved (3.2), mainly 
by assessing firms’ development, participation and mechanism constraints (3.2.1). These 
constraints are relevant in order to determine when the model’s calculus relations between its 
different components stand without discrete leaps. As these constraints are analyzed, 
observations about some industrial contexts and the effects of legal shifts in expectations of IP 
protection are made particularly in the case of non-practicing entities—firms that invent or 
own an invention, but prefer not to innovate. Then, the model describes the process by which 
firms choose their technology management mechanism (3.2.2), and some industrial contexts in 
which some firms might have dominant strategies are discussed. Outcomes of legal shifts of IP 
protection are part of this examination. This survey is briefly extended in terms of the simple 
or complex nature of firms’ innovations (3.2.3): simple innovations require few inputs and are 
relatively of little use in other firms’ innovation processes, while complex innovations 
necessitate an important number of inputs and can themselves be integrated as input into 
numerous other innovation processes.  
 
In the last section, a two-firm game theoretic process of this model is developed (3.3). 
After first describing the game itself (3.3.1), dominant-strategy, pure-strategy and mixed-
strategy Nash Equilibria are described and analyzed (3.3.2). Finally, for this two-firm variant, 
the goal of this paper is achieved: the effects of legal shifts of expectations of IP protection 
53 
 
over firms’ internal inventions are examined in the context of a focal firm’s strategy in the 
mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium of this game. One particularly interesting insight from the 
model’s formal analysis is that, contrary to common reasoning, an increase in a firm’s 
expectations of IP protection over its invention does not necessarily boost that firm’s 
likelihood or willingness to choose IP protection as its technology management mechanism. 
 
To make the model more concrete, and because it is designed for inventions and 
innovations, it is presumed, unless specified otherwise, that patents are the IP mechanism at 
stake. Other forms of IP or of legal regimes that impact on technology managers’ expectations 
can similarly be analyzed using this model, with a few adaptations. 
 
3.1 The Structure 
 
In the model’s basic form, the industrial environment is composed of n playing firms 
under the set N, where N = {1, 2, ..., i, ..., j, ..., n}. Here, j refers to any firm or technology not 
i, while -i designates the whole set with the exclusion of i. To reduce technology management 
to its simplest applications, each firm playing in this technology game exploits only one 
potential innovation, which in turn contains one and only one internal invention. Unlike how it 
may appear at first glance, this simplification is by and large consistent with the industrial 
environment envisioned in Chapter 2. For this model to somewhat reproduce the technology 
management processes of firm organizations that would actually make more than one 
invention or think of developing more than one innovation, one needs only to consider that 
each of these organizations’ individual inventive units or teams represents one player. Since 
large organizations tend to decentralize their activities to a level that gives ample autonomy to 
their units (Phelps and Kline 2009; Chesbrough 2003; Saxenian 1994), these firms’ inter-unit 
relationships, communications and tensions approximate this model’s inter-player interactions. 
It is also on the basis of decentralized units that the previous chapter’s discussion about 
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learning mechanisms and capabilities applied to inter- as much as to intra-organizational 
learning.
64
 
 
Ensuing from this reduction to singularity, a player’s technology is defined dually, 
encompassing one internally-invented input and one potential innovative product. Sometimes, 
the inventive activities are consciously driven towards specific objectives; other times, the 
invention emerges incidentally or without its originator even being aware that an invention is 
unfolding. In the software sector, for example, it happens regularly that computer 
programmers code new, non-obvious and useful functionalities without taking notice 
(Stallman 2002). To cover all those patterns of invention, the shape of the internally-invented 
input is predetermined exogenously by the model, yet unspecified. Although the basic model 
does not count out the possibility that two firms made the same invention, the majority, if not 
the totality, of firms’ internal inventions differ. Had it happened that two firms brought out the 
same invention, the model does not constrain these two firms to contemplate the same 
innovation. In fact, the innovative product consists merely of a potentiality in a firm’s 
technology because the decision to develop the firm’s innovation up to market is endogenous 
to this model. It is therefore generally the case that firms have different technology offerings; 
in other terms, it is assumed in this model, particularly in its two-firm version, that 
technology i ≠ technology j, albeit the model could allow the possibility for some technologies 
to be identical in the case where n is high. So long as most of the industrial environment’s 
technologies contrast with one another, ensuring that many players do not directly compete for 
the same market(s), the model’s assumption of openness stands.65 These differing technologies 
generate individualized variables and parameters for each player. Hence, even if the model 
presents identical decision-making processes and dilemmas to all players, firms usually play 
differently, in all likelihood ending in asymmetric results.  
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  See Section 2.3 above. 
65
  By this assumption, firms adopt open innovation strategies; for more information, see Section 2.3 above. 
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For reference through the next pages, the objective function to be optimized by each 
player in this paper’s model follows as Equation 1.1. The rest of this section defines and 
outlines each and every element involved in this objective function and describes interactions 
that occur between players. 
 
iV ( i i , iq , λ-i π-i , q-i) := – ic  – 
D
ic ( iq , λ-i π-i , q-i) + iz ( i i , iq , q-i)  
– i
IP
iC  – 
S
iC ( iq ) + [ i i  + iq ] 
M
iR  + [1 – i i  – iq ] 
*
iR   (1.1) 
 
3.1.1 Choice Variables and their Cost Functions 
 
In compliance with principles of microeconomic theory, each firm chooses cost and 
revenue determinants within its control to maximize the technological value, iV  , that it 
expects to capture from its technology.
66
 By the assumption that firms in this model embrace 
openness, opportunities offered by knowledge flows, for the internal invention as well as for 
the potential innovative product and knowledge derived thereof, must be reckoned with in 
value-optimizing decisions.
67
 This paper’s model reduces firms’ decisions to two variables 
chosen simultaneously: IP protection and secrecy. Each of these variables represents a 
mechanism that enables firms to exert some control over access and use of their internally-
developed invention, and the applied knowledge stemming therefrom. Downstream in the 
innovation process, these mechanisms increase firms’ expected revenue accruing from the 
market exploitation of their potential innovative product. As a result, both of these technology 
management mechanisms influence significantly how firms handle knowledge flows 
(Chesbrough and Ghafele 2014). As the other side of a coin, technology management costs, 
which comprise the direct costs of choosing a positive value for any of these two variables, 
accompany this decision.  
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  For readability purposes, the fact that some variables and parameters are based on expectations, as is the case 
with expected value here, is not marked. 
67
  For more context about knowledge flows and the assumption of openness, see Section 2.3 above. 
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The first variable, i , represents a firm’s discrete choice of filing for patent protection or 
not. As a binary variable, c
i   {0, 1}.
68
 Closely related to this decision is i , the industry’s 
level of expectations that firm i’s patent is valid and enforceable. i    [0, 1] and is 
exogenous, given by the state of the legal environment and taking into account the technical 
specifications of invention i, predetermined by nature.
69
 Shocks affecting i  sometimes apply 
to expectations of protection for all patents within an industry, as was generally the case in 
Chapter 1’s legal exposition of patents in the banking services industry. Other times, the 
consequences of these shifts focus on expectations for only a subset of patents within a wider 
industry, as could be observed with Myriad Genetics. These cases also exemplify that, because 
there are few inventions for which i  = 0 or i  = 1, firms are usually uncertain whether the 
patent protection they envisage is valid and enforceable. 
 
The decision to patent the firm’s internal invention requires a thorough examination of the 
accompanying costs of applying for and securing a patent grant. Embodied in IP
iC , these costs 
include examination, registration and maintenance fees; costs of legal services for patent 
prosecution;
70
 expected losses of market revenue due to unavoidable delays before the patent 
is granted; and any other unavoidable expense or abandoned value opportunity attached to the 
decision to patent the invention. As they are incurred upfront, none of these expenditures or 
value losses depend on expectations of patent protection, i . This cost parameter does not 
include patent enforcement costs, which are subsumed elsewhere in the objective function, 
namely, within benefits derived of knowledge transfers.
71
 Constructed this way, IP
iC  can be 
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  Variables with a c superscript refer to the optimized value chosen by a firm, with reference to said firm’s 
objective function. This choice is the focus of this chapter’s next sections. 
69
  See Chapter 1 for a conceptual and empirical exposition of the role of the legal environment on expectations 
of IP protection, πi. 
70
  To avoid possible confusion, a moment of legal jargon is in order. Patent prosecution refers to the application 
and review process with a national patent office. It should be distinguished from patent litigation, where a 
patent is challenged or enforced in court. 
71
  See zi below, in Subsection 3.1.2. As a reminder, enforcement has been defined at the beginning of Chapter 1. 
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assessed in advance by firm i and is thus fixed ex ante in this model. When c
i  = 0, it goes 
without explaining that these costs are null. In the model, this result is obtained simply by 
multiplying i  with the parameter 
IP
iC . 
 
The second choice variable, iq , is the expected level of trade secrecy that a firm chooses 
for that same invention. Trade secrecy is a continuous variable— c
iq    [0, 1]—because a firm 
has access to numerous means to endogenously reach a desired level of expectations that its 
internal invention shall stay secret. To enumerate a few: inserting non-competition, 
confidentiality and loyalty clauses in its employees’ contracts—in exchange of which 
employees are likely to request monetary compensations—(Gilson 1999; Gervais and Judge 
2011); providing limited and guarded entry to the firm’s premises (Landes and Posner 2003); 
and incorporating digital restrictions management (“DRM”) components in the firm’s 
technology (Phillips 2009).
72
 Moreover, there exist means that, despite not enhancing a given 
level of secrecy like those just listed, contribute to maintain it through the firm’s activities, 
such as having the firm’s partners agree to non-disclosure agreements (O’Connor 2010); 
relying on intermediaries to find potential partners without disclosing technically- or 
commercially-sensitive knowledge about the firm’s technology (Möslein 2013);73 and taking 
extra precautions in daily operations (Kitch 1977), like refusing to deal with some potential 
customers or partners because of their capabilities at reverse-engineering or otherwise 
breaking the secret. 
 
                                                          
72
  DRM means are used to digitally block some uses of, and access over, some technologies. Drawing on 
digitally prehistoric examples, access to the content of a CD may require a password. Likewise, in the film 
industry, DVDs and Blu-Ray discs have components that make it impossible to extract their content without 
first circumventing or breaking a DRM mechanism. These discs can thus only be played, and their content 
cannot be accessed by regular means. In computer-related industries, DRM can be highly sophisticated, and it 
is used to keep some knowledge, including some inventions, secret. 
73
  A combination of intermediaries and contracts can be particularly attractive if knowledge around the internal 
invention is articulated. Once articulated knowledge is transmitted to potential partners, the ease with which 
the latter can appropriate and reproduce that knowledge, when it is not legally protected by contract or IP, has 
been well documented, starting with theoretical work by Arrow (1959). 
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Like its IP counterpart, a reliance on secrecy is only possible through costly management 
decisions since measures carried out by a firm to reinforce the secrecy surrounding its internal 
invention implicate efforts or expenditures. This paper’s model distinguishes between the 
costs of enhancing secrecy, which determine the level of secrecy expectations chosen by the 
focal firm, and the costs of maintaining secrecy. The latter is examined within the cost 
function of the firm’s technology, when discussing the impact of firms’ chosen levels of 
secrecy on knowledge flow opportunities.
74
 The costs of enhancing secrecy, however, are not 
covered therein, mostly because they differ in two ways. First, specific means of secrecy are 
mutually independent; hence costs ascribed to each secrecy-enhancing measure chosen by a 
firm do not expand or diminish depending on the firm’s adoption or rejection of other means 
available. Second, the direct and opportunity costs of secrecy-enhancing means are unaffected 
by technology management decisions made by other firms in the industrial environment. As an 
example of these two traits, security services cost the same amount whether their potential 
hiring firms combine these services with other means of secrecy or not; the same can be said 
with respect to the technology management decisions carried out by other firms in the 
industrial environment. This independence can be logically evaluated for most secrecy-
enhancing measures one can think of. For these reasons, when a firm chooses a positive level 
of trade secrecy, it can ex ante determine its optimal secrecy-enhancing means for any 
expected level that the firm envisages. These costs, S
iC , are strictly increasing as the level of 
secrecy expectations chosen by a firm, c
iq , escalates.  
 
Designed this way, S
iC  must be at its maximum when 
c
iq  = 1.
75
 At this point, the firm 
elects to implement sufficient and necessary measures to guarantee full secrecy over its 
internal invention and to maintain this secret. Exogenously, law significantly shapes secrecy 
measures at a firm’s disposal, by enabling or confining them and affecting their costs. For 
instance, legal protection of trade secrets results in lower costs for firms to protect their trade 
                                                          
74
  See 
D
ic  and zi below, in Subsection 3.1.2. 
75
  Keeping in mind value-optimizing principles on which firms’ decisions are predicated, firms in these 
conditions choose the least costly path that leads to full secrecy for their internal inventions. The endogenous 
method by which firms choose their level of secrecy expectations is described in Subsection 3.2.2. 
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information (Lemley 2011). Conversely, operating in a legal environment that does not punish 
actions that breach secrecy, for instance reverse-engineering, relatively increases the costs of 
secrecy expectations. Therefore, this model also analyzes some effects of secrecy-related legal 
factors through S
iC  or the bounds of 
c
iq .  
 
Building on basic value-optimizing principles, it is assumed that the firm adopts secrecy-
enhancing means in a decreasing order of efficiency, with the theoretical result that the higher 
is a firm’s contemplated level of secrecy, the more costly is a marginal increment to this level. 
When the firm decides not to take any measure to secure the secret around its internal 
invention, S
iC  = 0. At this level, it is assumed that 
c
iq  = 0 because the firm then has minimal 
expectations that secrecy shall linger on.
76
 Therefore, the cost structure for secrecy-enhancing 
means can be written: 
 
S
iC  := 
S
iC ( iq )         (2) 
where  S
iC (0) = 0, and 
S
iC (
c
iq ) is increasing and convex, i.e., 
i
S
i
dq
dC
 > 0, 
2
2
i
S
i
dq
Cd
 ≥ 0. 
For any level of secrecy expectations other than the absence thereof and full secrecy, the firm 
is strictly uncertain whether secrecy surrounding its internal invention shall be kept. 
 
                                                          
76
  To be accurate, choosing not to make any effort to protect the firm’s secret may actually entail qi > 0 since 
secrecy expectations here are minimal, not null. For instance, if the internal invention is believed by other 
players to be of trivial value, or applied knowledge associated therewith is tacit enough for its transfer to 
require substantial costs or efforts (see Section 2.3 above), it might well happen that most actors in the 
industrial environment do not expect any net gain by exposing the invention or being exposed to it. In turn, 
this scenario indicates the possibility for secrecy expectations to be positive despite the absence of efforts 
allocated to this purpose. Relying on assumptions of strict monotonicity based on the shape of 
S
iC , the model 
herein bypasses this situation without loss of generality by assessing qi to be at its absolute minimum in these 
situations, i.e., 
c
iq  = 0 when the firm makes no effort to secure secrecy around its internal invention. 
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Since patents involve public registration and disclosure (Scotchmer 2004; Landes and 
Posner 2003), it is assumed in the model that when the firm applies for patent protection, it 
cannot expect a positive level of secrecy.
77
 This assumption, coupled with value-maximizing 
principles under which firms will not choose to waste resources or efforts, imposes the 
constraint c
i  + 
c
iq   [0, 1] and thus introduces a tension between both variables. Hinted at 
the beginning of Chapter 1, this trade-off between patent protection and secrecy is well-
documented, both conceptually (Teece 1986; Gallini 2002; Landes and Posner 2003) and 
empirically (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000; Graham et al 2009). 
 
A positive value for either c
i  or 
c
iq , whichever it is, installs the firm in comparable 
circumstances: it wields a mechanism to control access to its internal invention and its uses, it 
faces direct costs for its technology management mechanism, it likely has to plod through a 
field of uncertainty, and, as shall now be examined, it encounters indirect ramifications arising 
from improving or worsening value opportunities in firms’ innovation processes. 
 
3.1.2 Technology Costs and Knowledge Flows 
 
Each firm expects costs and value opportunities in association with its technology, T
iC , 
composed of three steps that respectively cover (i) the inception of the firm’s internal 
invention; (ii) the development of the innovative product, including inbound knowledge flows; 
and (iii) potential outbound knowledge flows and patent litigation during the innovation 
process.
78
 
 
                                                          
77
  See the beginning of Chapter 1. Once symmetry of information, an admittedly strong assumption, is pre-
supposed, public registration or public disclosure are each sufficient to carry this result, and all forms of IP 
protection involve either one or the other, or both as is the case of patents (Scotchmer 2004). 
78
  For the characteristics of, and differences between, inbound and outbound knowledge flows, see Section 2.3 
above. 
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The firm’s technological endeavours begin with the contriving of its internal invention. 
As mentioned above, the shape of this invention is unspecified in this model, an abstraction 
that must also extend to the process by which the internal invention is obtained. It follows that 
the costs associated with the invention’s inception, ic , are a fixed parameter out of the firm’s 
control and unaffected by its technology management decisions. With this internal invention 
in hand, the firm gets two opportunities: first, integrating it into an innovation project, 
alongside other inputs or design components that are either developed internally or acquired 
through inbound knowledge flows; second, sharing this internally-invented input with other 
firms through outbound knowledge flows. The bi-directionality of knowledge flows replicates 
real-life industrial networks in which firms are both potential inventors and users (of others’ 
inventions). Whether a transferor or a transferee, a firm enters into a knowledge flow 
transaction with another if the associated net value that it expects to capture out of it is 
positive (Zajac and Olsen 1993). 
 
Through inbound knowledge flows, a firm can obtain applied (inventive) or technical 
(innovative) knowledge or inputs from other firms in order to increase its technology’s net 
value. This result generally occurs by reducing the costs of the focal firm’s development 
process, D
ic , in comparison with the costs of independent innovation—namely, the ex ante 
minimal costs of the development activities that the firm would have undertaken internally, 
absent transactions, to attain the same innovative result.
79
  
 
                                                          
79
  Being limited to development, the costs of independent innovation exclude the costs of making the internal 
inventive input, ic . The costs of independent innovation are ex ante minimal: the firm assesses in advance its 
optimal internal development process, which is not specified by the model, nor does it need to be. Obviously, 
if the firm’s expected costs of independent innovation are lower than the development costs envisaged instead 
with the inclusion of a particular inbound knowledge flow, a rational firm would elect not to carry out the 
deal, unless the transaction provides additional and compensating value through other channels, for instance, 
because the external input increases the firm’s expected market revenue for the innovative product by 
attracting additional customers. By focusing on the net value created by a transaction instead of the formal 
exchange covered by it, the model takes into account these subsidiary sources, or losses, of value. 
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When positioned on the other side of a prospective transaction, a firm can transfer its own 
invention, its innovation, or knowledge stemming thereof to gain supplementary net value, 
iz , 
typically as a monetary compensation.
80
 Even in the absence of patent protection or of 
secrecy-maintaining measures, transferring knowledge components to another firm does not 
necessarily entail a loss of control over that knowledge. Inputs or designs produced by know-
how or ensuing from tacit knowledge,
81
 for instance, can be very costly to replicate for the 
transferee. The business model of consultant firms often adheres to this pattern. When 
disassembling T
iC  into its three terms, iz  contrasts with ic  and 
D
ic  because, by construction, 
it represents a value gain in the objective function.  
 
How do these three terms integrate potential knowledge flows? Suppose that firm i 
invents a new microchip and innovates a novel computer that runs on this chip. Another firm, 
j, develops a software application, and the faster the computers used to program its software 
work, the cheaper are its development costs. If firm j has capabilities in computer 
manufacturing and wishes to add firm i’s chip in the computers that it customizes for its own 
innovation process, it can potentially do so through a transaction with firm i. A similar 
opportunity presents itself if firm j does not intend to build its own computers from scratch 
and instead wishes to buy several of firm i’s computers. A third possibility is that firm j does 
not actually benefit from better computers, but it does from learning about the performance 
level of the next generation of chips, in order to determine how complex its software 
application can be while still running smoothly on its customers’ devices. This technical 
knowledge can be treated as an input in firm j’s innovation process, and acquiring this 
knowledge through a transaction with an important chip and computer producer like firm i 
may be simpler and less costly and provide more accurate data for firm j than estimating it by 
                                                          
80
  As the previous note implies, monetary compensation directly ensuing from the transaction is not the only 
way outbound knowledge flows can increase a firm’s net technological value. The case of IBM and its 
purposive reliance on network externalities, described in Section 2.3, constitutes a good example. 
81
  See the end of Section 2.3. 
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its own means.
82
 By virtue of principles of microeconomic theory, in these three scenarios, the 
knowledge flow would only take place if the net value of the transaction is positive for both 
parties involved (Zajac and Olsen 1993). If the transaction’s net value is positive for both 
parties, it is computed in this model via an increase in 
iz  and a decline in 
D
jc . For any firm 
for which the knowledge flow is outbound, even when the input transmitted is the innovation 
itself, this additional value is separate from the revenues expected to accrue from the customer 
market for the innovative product. In this paragraph’s example, it means that the sale of 
firm i’s computers to the general consumer market is accounted for elsewhere in the model, as 
market revenue.
84
 
 
The calculation of a transaction’s net value reckons with transaction costs—defined as the 
combination of (i) the direct costs of implementing the transaction and (ii) the indirect costs of 
identifying it in the first place.
85
 Partly because of transaction costs, the net value acquired 
through knowledge flows is affected by technology management decisions, whether those of 
the focal firm or those of its prospective partners. A firm’s choice of positive secrecy 
expectations, if no extra care is applied, is susceptible to decrease as the firm interacts with 
other actors in the industrial environment. In order to maintain its chosen level of secrecy 
expectations, the firm can rely on non-disclosure agreements, intermediaries and a diversity of 
precautionary measures, which, in turn, inflate the transaction’s costs. These additional 
transaction costs can be direct, for instance when a party adopts special procedures and 
safeguards to deal with knowledge disclosed under a non-disclosure agreement, or indirect, as 
is the case when a secretive party hires an intermediary, or when a firm has to scrutinize the 
industry more closely to spot a secretive firm with which it can have a valuable transaction. 
On a case by case basis, secrecy thence entails that either one or both of the parties involved in 
a knowledge flow could benefit less than it or they would in the absence of secrecy, 
                                                          
82
  It is worth noting that this third instance embodies a situation where a firm’s decision to keep its invention  
entirely secret does not prove much of an obstacle for a knowledge flow transaction to be beneficial, given 
that at least one of the two firms involved can spot the transaction opportunity. 
84
  This model’s treatment of market revenue is exposed in Subsection 3.1.3 below. 
85
  To be clear, transaction costs in this model are conceptually different from transaction costs in Baldwin and 
Von Hippel’s model discussed in Section 2.2. 
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sometimes to the point that aborting the transaction altogether becomes the most rational 
decision. Logically, the magnitude of secrecy-maintaining measures to be implemented, and 
their associated costs, can only go up or stay even as the firm’s chosen level of secrecy 
expectations expands. Consequently, iq  and the vector q-i must be included as arguments in 
both D
ic  and iz : conditional on each firm’s technology management choices not triggering 
discrete reactions in the industrial environment, a condition that applies to all calculus 
assumptions described in the present subsection,
86
 development costs are non-decreasing as 
the level of secrecy expectations chosen by any firm augments, while revenue from outbound 
knowledge flows are non-increasing in the same circumstances. 
 
Costs of secrecy-maintaining measures vary. Whereas firms that need to preserve 
relatively low secrecy expectations could be satisfied by high- as well as low-performing 
means, firms that need to sustain relatively high expectations should be more apprehensive of 
measures that could perform poorly. It follows that when the level of secrecy expectations to 
maintain is low, the array of secrecy-maintaining means at the firm’s disposal is wider. Some 
of these additional means are likely to be more cost-efficient. Based on the assumption that 
firms’ managers are guided by value-optimizing principles, it is thus surmised in this model 
that the secrecy-maintaining measures that can suitably sustain increments of secrecy 
expectations are most costly the higher a firm’s initially-chosen level of secrecy expectations 
is—for all parties involved in the knowledge flow transaction. This presumption dictates the 
shape of the second derivative of both D
ic  (convex) and iz  (concave) with respect to iq  and 
to any component of the vector q-i. 
 
A firm’s management decision to patent its internal invention has more ambiguous effects 
on the industrial ecosystem, mostly because, here, the consequences vary greatly between both 
sides of a knowledge flow transaction. In their inbound knowledge flows, patentees’ 
development costs remain unchanged by their own decision. In their outbound knowledge 
                                                          
86
  These discrete leaps are discussed endogenously in Subsections 3.2.1, 3.2.2 and 3.2.3. 
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flows, however, patentees can enforce their patents, resulting in three additional segments of 
expected value benefits and costs. First, patentees can find beneficial transactions into which 
they would not have entered absent this legal protection, typically because they would not 
have enjoyed sufficient negotiating leverage or control over knowledge spillovers for them to 
find positive net value in these flows. Second, in cases where patentees would have agreed to 
some transactions even absent their patents, they might expect to be able to capture more value 
from these transactions than they would have obtained otherwise. Third, patentees can launch 
litigation procedures against firms to which they have not contractually permitted the use of 
their patented inventions.
87
 Litigation is the equivalent of trying to convince or force, 
respectively through a negotiated settlement or trial, another firm to enter into a valuable 
transaction with the patentee.
88
 (Sometimes, based on the terms of the settlement or the 
judgment, there might not even be a knowledge flow associated with the “transaction” —only 
a cash flow.) 
 
For a situation to lead to litigation or settlement instead of a negotiated transaction, it 
suffices that the patentee expects higher positive net value this way, or that it expects positive 
net value through litigation while the defending firm expects to be subjected to negative net 
value through either litigation or any transaction. If the patentee wins in court, the 
consequence for the losing party is the equivalent of a substantial value loss, not counting also 
                                                          
87
  These three segments of value are consistent with how enforcement is defined at the beginning of Chapter 1. 
88
  Algebraic examples might help to better discern the three segments. Suppose firm i has a patented input, and 
firm j could potentially be interested in it for its own innovation process. Firm j cannot substitute firm i’s 
input with any third-party alternative. The two firms negotiate as best as they can for their own benefits. 
With the first segment, absent the patent, firm i gets net value x1, x1 < 0. No matter what positive net 
value firm j would get from the deal, firm i should reject it. By enforcing a patent in the transaction’s 
negotiations, firm i now captures r1, r1 ≥ 0, while firm j potentially ends up with w1, w1 ≥ 0. Both parties 
accept this transaction. 
With the second segment, absent the patent, firm i gets net value x2, x2 ≥ 0, while firm j receives y2, 
y2 ≥ 0. No patent is necessary for both parties to accept this transaction. By enforcing a patent, though, firm i 
now captures r2, r2 ≥ x2, while firm j ends up with w2, where y2 ≥ w2 ≥ 0. Both parties continue to find this 
transaction valuable, although firm j might be dissatisfied by the outcome because firm i’s patent enforcement 
generally triggers a greater transfer from firm j to firm i. 
With the third segment, absent the patent, no matter what is the value obtained by firm i, firm j receives 
y3, y3 < 0. Therefore, firm j would refuse any transaction. By launching litigation procedures, firm i now 
captures r3, r3 ≥ 0, while firm j could accept a settlement deal with net value loss w3, where 0 > w3 ≥ s3. s3 
typically represents the sum of the costs of firm j’s legal defense and its expected loss in the case that the 
court rules in its disadvantage. 
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the costs of legal defense. If the defending firm wins in court, it still has to pay its legal fees. If 
the settlement loss of value for the defendant is lower than the expected loss of value of patent 
trial,
89
 the defendant should settle, a rational decision even if the defendant actually believes 
the patent to be invalid or unenforceable against its firm (Lemley and Shapiro 2005). This 
calculated behaviour is reminiscent of the heavily disparaged post-State-Street legal 
environment described in Section 1.2, where many firms invoked weak patents to collect rent 
from other firms. 
 
Litigating, however, is less tempting when the defending party also patented its internal 
invention. As mentioned in Chapter 1, patents that have been granted are presumed to be valid, 
so the active litigant’s expectations of winning in court against that other firm relatively 
decrease as that other firm acquired a patent of its own, bringing down the active litigant’s 
expected benefits from the third segment. Actually, firms that possess substantial patent 
portfolios tend to rarely clash in court, or at least to quickly reach a settlement agreement that 
includes cross-licensing;
90
 patents are often acquired with a defensive intent in order to chill 
potential active litigants (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000; Shapiro 2000; Mann 2005). 
 
Since the model is designed in a way that leaves patent enforcement costs out of IP
iC , 
they must be included in 
iz . These costs mainly consist of attorney and negotiation fees. 
Owing to the patentee’s dormant option not to enforce its patent, 
iz ( i i  = i )
91
 must be 
bounded minimally at 
iz ( i i  = 0). This floor is applicable to each prospective enforcement 
decision because, for each of them, a value-optimizing firm would not elect to enforce its 
patent unless its expected additional benefits arising from a particular enforcement exceed its 
corresponding expected costs. This account of enforcement and litigation imposes that the 
firm’s revenues accruing from outbound knowledge flows, 
iz , are non-decreasing in i i . 
                                                          
89
  Expectations are based on πi. 
90
  With the notable exception of Apple and Samsung! (Although strictly against each other.) See Bruneau 
(2013) for a fuller account of this behaviour. 
91
  When firm i chooses to patent its internal invention, λi = 1. zi’s other arguments are held constant. 
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However, when they increase, this augmentation can be relatively lower when 
j j  > 0 or 
when 
j j  rises simultaneously. Due to the foregoing analysis of enforcement, [ i i ] is 
herein inserted as an argument within the function 
iz . 
 
The development costs, D
ic , of firms on the inbound side of these enforcement decisions 
are obviously affected.
92
 Through the first segment, these firms can benefit from patent 
enforcement as they participate in extra transactions that provide them with positive net value. 
When firms participate to a second-segment transaction from an inbound point of view, 
however, the net value accruing to them is non-increasing with respect to the transaction that 
would take place absent their partners’ patents. In most cases, this net value is actually 
diminishing since the said partners, thanks to their patents, stand in a stronger position in their 
negotiations. Finally, as explained above, the third segment is always detrimental to defending 
firms, although less so when the defending firm patented its own internal invention. Strictly 
for this third segment, expected development costs escalate for each other firm that patents its 
internal invention, as these IP titles increase the risks that firms—accidentally, willfully, or not 
at all—infringe some enforceable patents and face litigation procedures. As described before, 
these expected costs can be mitigated, although not nullified, when i i  > 0. To deal with the 
bi-directionality of observations related to these three segments, it is assumed in the model 
that firms on the inbound side of transactions expect potential losses from the second and third 
segments to exceed potential benefits from the first, even when i i  > 0. By taking into 
account the negotiating leverage that a patent provides in first-segment transactions, this 
assumption usually provides a reasonable outlook. Thus the vector [λ-i π-i] is integrated as an 
argument to D
ic .  
 
 
                                                          
92
  This paragraph is algebraically expounded in note 89, firm j. 
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The question arises though: are there cross-effects between this vector and firm i’s 
technology management option of choosing secrecy? Theoretically, yes. For instance, risks of 
additional development costs associated with the third segment could be reduced by choosing 
secrecy, or additional secrecy, as a patentee cannot litigate against firms it is not aware of. 
Conversely, to counterbalance the expected loss of transactional value ensuing from the 
second segment, or to increase net value accruing from first-segment transactions that were 
not contemplated in the absence of the other party’s patent, firm i could anticipatively or 
reactively choose to reduce its level of secrecy expectations. Because these cross-effects occur 
on a case-by-case basis and are potentially bi-directional, assessing these interactions within 
the model is particularly difficult and significantly reduces the intuition that the model may 
provide. Accordingly, it is assumed herein that these cross-interactions do not occur in the 
choice of firms’ optimal level of secrecy expectations; c
iq  is independent from both the 
vectors [λ-i π-i] and q-i.  
 
This design verily leads to a loss of generality for the model by leaving out some 
substantial cross-interactions between firms’ technology management decisions. Yet it is not 
so (i) when these cross-effects would actually not occur, on a case-by-case basis; (ii) when 
these effects would mutually cancel themselves because of their potential bi-directionality; or 
(iii) when they would be of too little significance to counterbalance any other effect captured 
by the model as it is. By multiplying knowledge flow interactions, the model’s assumption of 
openness supports the second and third scenarios, particularly in industrial landscapes that 
comprise a high number of firms. To summarize this crucial subsection: 
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T
iC ( i i , iq , λ-i π-i , q-i) := ic  + 
D
ic ( iq , λ-i π-i , q-i) – iz ( i i , iq , q-i)   (3) 
where  
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3.1.3 Market Revenue 
 
As could be observed in previous subsections, it is assumed in the model that many 
determinants in which firms usually have a say and that impact value-maximizing decisions, 
such as the costs of securing patent protection or of secrecy-enhancing measures, are elected 
ex ante with value-maximizing principles. This method is adopted in order to better redirect 
the interactive effects of the two technology management variables toward the knowledge 
flow components, while still giving due consideration to other industrial factors. It is again 
relied on with respect to the model’s market revenue structure, where most of the determinants 
within firms’ purview, such as their levels of production, are determined ex ante, regardless of 
firms’ actual decisions with respect to i  and iq . In this paper’s theoretical model, these 
market revenue components are simplified as parameters, although they are not so in reality. 
This treatment is enabled by the model because ex post interactive effects on market revenue 
of firms’ choices for their two technology management variables are already incorporated 
within T
iC , in the analysis of knowledge flows’ net value. For each firm, there are thus only two 
market scenarios that warrant examination. Both are based on the strength of firms’ market 
position. 
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On the one hand, if the firm succeeds in maintaining secrecy over its internal inventive 
input or in being granted a valid and enforceable patent that covers this internal invention, the 
firm can exert some control over its use and access. Since this input is incorporated in the 
firm’s innovation, the firm benefits from a relatively strong market position for its innovative 
product. Drawing on conventional microeconomic theory, it follows that the firm takes into 
account this stronger market position when it selects its business model of competitive 
advantage. By assessing potential business models, the firm determines ex ante the market 
revenue structure by which its expected value is maximized with this competitive advantage.
93
 
Various elements would need to be mulled over, or minute hypotheses to be laid down, for this 
paper’s model to express any definitive statement on the form of the firm’s business model, 
whether a standard monopoly model that restrains output to artificially induce scarcity and 
thus raise market price; price discrimination structures like tariffs or market separation; tie-in 
sales; or any other mechanism. Although interesting, these decisions are outside the scope of 
this paper. Hence, this paper’s model does not presume of the business model opted for by the 
firm under a scenario of competitive advantage, nor does it need to so long as market revenue 
expectations generated by this business model are deemed to maximize the firm’s expected 
value for its innovative product. Ex ante expected market revenue determined this way, and 
thence associated with a business model of competitive advantage, is denoted M
iR . 
 
On the other hand, if the secret surrounding the internal inventive input has been 
revealed—to be noted, choosing to dispense with secrecy94 automatically discloses the 
invention—and the firm has not secured a valid and enforceable patent over it, then other 
                                                          
93
  To be clear, firms do not maximize expected market revenue. Value optimization requires firms to take into 
account their cost structures. In these ex ante operations, since no decisions have yet been made with respect 
to technology management, the costs of independent innovation are the development costs under 
consideration. If the cost structure of secrecy or of patent protection then necessitates a downward adjustment 
to the market revenue structure, it is accounted for as an indirect cost of secrecy-enhancing measures within 
S
iC  or of applying and securing a patent within 
IP
iC . (See how these two cost structures are defined in 
Subsection 3.1.1.) Other ex post adjustments in the value optimization of development costs and market 
revenue are captured in the analysis of knowledge flows. “Adjustments” can be substantial. 
94
  qi = 0. See note 76 above and accompanying text for specific assumptions about this situation. 
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firms can access and use the focal firm’s internal invention and applied knowledge emanating 
thereof.
95
 In this situation, market competition between the focal firm and market suppliers of 
substitutable products is more on par. This context of even competition, like its counterpart of 
competitive advantage, is acknowledged in the firm’s ex ante determination of its optimal 
business model. Here as well, this paper’s model does not specify the nature of this business 
model in any way expect that it establishes ex ante the firm’s market revenue structure that 
maximizes the firm’s expected market value in circumstances of even competition. The firm 
can achieve this result using a typical model of perfect competition, a first-mover advantage, 
product differentiation, branding, and so forth. Using equivalent notation as for the business 
model of competitive advantage, the firm’s market revenue structure, when relying on a 
business model of even competition, is marked *
iR . 
 
Because business models of even competition remain available to firms that reap the 
benefits of a competitive advantage, it must be the case that, for a given innovative product, 
M
iR  ≥ 
*
iR .
96
 In delineating enforcement, price determination of innovative market products 
had been set aside.
97
 In line with this qualification and consequent with how the market 
revenue parameters have been defined, the business models singled out by the firm—and 
which constitute M
iR  and 
*
iR —are determined independently of the firm’s choices for its two 
technology management variables. Regarding the calculation of expected market revenue, 
these variables only determine the probabilities with which the firm expects each of these two 
business models, and concomitant market revenue structures, to emerge. Under the axioms of 
Von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) and the assumption of risk-neutrality, the overall 
                                                          
95
  That other firms can access and use the invention and related applied knowledge does not mean that the focal 
firm retains no advantage from being their originator. For instance, if applied knowledge attached to this 
invention is tacit, other firms may have to incur substantial costs and delays to access and use it without the 
originator’s support. Similar issues were discussed in the analysis of 
T
iC  in Subsection 3.1.2. 
96
  An obvious scenario in which the ex ante value-maximizing revenues are equal for both types of business 
models is 
M
iR  = 
*
iR  = 0, in other words, when it is always optimal, ex ante, for a firm not to develop its 
innovation. 
97
  See the beginning of Chapter 1. 
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expectations of market revenue by the firm, based on these probabilities stemming from 
technology management decisions, is summed up as: 
 
iR ( i i , iq ) := [ i i  + iq ] 
M
iR  + [1 – i i  – iq ] 
*
iR      
  = [ i i  + iq ] [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ] + 
*
iR      (4) 
where   
ii
iR


 = M
iR  – 
*
iR  ≥ 0  and  
i
i
q
R


 = M
iR  – 
*
iR  ≥ 0. 
 
By adding all of the cost and revenue structures described in this section and defined in 
Equations 2, 3 and 4, the value-maximizing function expounded in Equation 1.1 can be 
rewritten at a more abstract level, focusing on the choice variables: 
iV ( i i , iq , λ-i π-i, q-i) = –
T
iC ( i i , iq , λ-i π-i , q-i) – i
IP
iC  – 
S
iC ( iq )  
+ iR ( i i , iq )        (1.2) 
 
3.2 The Basic Model—Multi-Firm Interactions 
 
While it is assumed herein that most of the firm’s value determinants can be optimized ex 
ante regardless of the firm’s technology management decisions, this approach cannot be 
extended to factors that are affected by other firms’ choices for their own technology 
management variables. This is the lot of an industrial environment characterized by open 
innovation, in which firms consider transactions with one another during the innovation 
process. Firm i tries to guess firm j’s technology management decisions in its own value-
optimizing choices, and vice-versa. Firms’ reciprocal attempts at assessing their respective 
behaviour imply that a focal firm ought to anticipate as accurately as it can the rippling effects 
that its choices will have on its own innovation process through other firms’ expected 
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responses to, and prescience of, these decisions. Without this appraisal, the focal firm would 
fail to internalize other firms’ adjustments in its management processes, leading to sub-
optimal decision-making. This game theoretic technique is at the center stage of each firm’s 
technology costs, T
iC , in which knowledge flow interactions and decisions are encompassed. 
This section explores general interactive and endogenous effects that can be observed in the 
model, while Section 3.3 reduces the problem to a two-firm context, for an in-depth game 
theoretic analysis. 
 
3.2.1 Constraints and Discrete Leaps 
 
It was specified in Subsection 3.1.2 that most of the model’s calculus assumptions are 
conditional to the absence of discrete reactions. Circumstances by which a value-optimizing 
firm would make a discrete choice can be identified endogenously in the model. Three 
possible leaping scenarios emerge, each corresponding to a constraint: the development, 
participation and mechanism constraints. These constraints and the effects of leaps on the 
model guide the structure of this section. 
 
Development Constraint 
 
The net sum of expected costs and revenues associated with the innovative dimension of a 
firm’s technology must be positive for the firm to choose to develop this innovation. 
Otherwise, the firm would rationally prefer not to innovate, with a resulting development 
value of zero. Define D
iz  as the part of iz  that represents technical (innovative) knowledge 
and inputs, and 0
iz  as the equivalent part of iz  with respect to applied (inventive) knowledge 
and inputs. By the definition of 
iz , 
0
iz  + 
D
iz  = iz , and both subdivisions have the same shape 
and arguments as 
iz . Having specified that, the development constraint can thence be 
expressed as 
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– D
ic ( iq , λ-i π-i , q-i) + 
D
iz ( i i , iq , q-i) + iR ( i i , iq ) ≥ 0. 
 
If the development constraint is not satisfied, the firm’s decision not to develop implies 
that 
M
iR  = 
*
iR  = iR ( i i , iq ) = 
D
ic ( iq , λ-i π-i , q-i) = 
D
iz ( i i , iq , q-i) = 0,
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and the model’s objective function set out as Equation 1.1, for this firm, becomes 
iV ( i i , iq , λ-i π-i , q-i) = – ic  + 
0
iz ( i i , iq , q-i) – i
IP
iC  – 
S
iC ( iq ). 
 
In this formulation, and based on Equations 2 and 3’s calculus assumptions, 
i
i
q
V


 = 
i
i
q
z

 0
 – 
i
S
i
dq
dC
 < 0. 
Therefore, when a firm does not innovate, secrecy fails to deliver any benefit to the focal firm. 
It follows that c
iq  = 0 when the development constraint is not met. Equation 2 requires that 
S
iC (0) = 0. The objective function of firms that do not develop an innovation, including other 
firms’ actual choices of technology management as shall be explored in Subsection 3.2.2 , is 
trimmed to 
0
iV ( i i , 0, λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) := – ic  + 
0
iz ( i i , 0, q
c
-i) – i
IP
iC    (5)  
 
With this function, the technology management decision becomes a simple one, reduced 
to the dilemma of patenting the internal invention or not. With a straight decomposition of 
                                                          
98
  Sometimes, the development constraint cannot be met because of exogenous factors, for instance, 
jurisdictions that forbid that university departments engage in business activities. In their case, these equalities 
are obtained exogenously, but the following analysis of their behaviour applies as well as if these firms had 
reached these results endogenously. 
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Equation 5, it surfaces that the firm seeks patent protection for its invention, with c
i  = 1, 
when 
0
iz ( i , 0, q
c
-i) – 
0
iz (0, 0, q
c
-i) ≥ 
IP
iC . 
In words, this firm plays patent protection when the net revenue extracted by patent 
enforcement, taking costs of enforcement into account, is high enough to compensate for the 
costs of obtaining a patent grant. All of these observations are conditional, of course, on the 
firm’s expected value to be positive, the object of the second constraint. 
 
Non-Practicing Entities 
 
In this model, firms for which the development constraint is not satisfied correspond to 
non-practicing entities, a group as varied as universities, research institutions and laboratories, 
IP aggregators and some start-ups (O’Connor 2010).  
 
IP aggregators are firms that offer patent-holders enforcement of their patents on their 
behalf—enforcement as defined herein. Specifically, they do not innovate. They have been 
getting a bad press since the turn of the century, earning the moniker “patent trolls” by those 
who criticize this industrial practice, a term that received some authoritative credence when 
President Obama used it in his 2014 State of Union address (Lamarque 2014). This 
disparaging treatment is directly related to the post-State-Street controversy described in 
Chapter 1: IP aggregators are more likely than other non-practicing entities to enforce weak 
patents, using them to collect rent.
99
 Since inventions protected by weak patents are, by their 
nature, obvious or already known, they provide little or no assistance to inventive and 
innovative endeavours of firms that pay royalties for them, willingly or grudgingly. To be fair, 
not all patents enforced by IP aggregators are weak. Furthermore, IP aggregators can 
contribute positively in the innovation landscape by supporting inventors with additional 
                                                          
99
  See Section 1.2 for a summary of the State Street controversy and a description of weak patents. 
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revenue,
100
 and by helping users by acting as a one-stop shop for inventive inputs and 
knowledge (O’Connor 2010). 
 
The model’s ramifications with respect to the development constraint invite three 
comments applicable to non-practicing entities in general, IP aggregators in particular for 
some of them. 
(i) Whether they patent their inventions or not, non-practicing entities tend to be 
transparent about the inventive material they possess. For IP aggregators, it is self-
evident since the business model consists in patent enforcement. In the academic 
context, this phenomenon is often attributed to cultural practices unique to scientific 
research (Merton 1973) or to the assertion that researchers’ rewards, like reputation, 
endowments, tenure, pride or personal satisfaction, necessitate (quick) publication 
(Fabrizio 2006). For aggregators as well as researchers, the model hints at a concurrent 
explanation: secrecy simply offers no benefits in the absence of innovation projects, 
making transparent mindsets unequivocally rational once the decision not to innovate 
has been taken. 
(ii) Should governments wish to address problems raised by the weak patents enforced by 
IP aggregators, as was the case of the Obama administration, the model indicates that 
policies and legal shifts that target and increase the costs of patent enforcement or 
acquisition—in the case of IP aggregators, patents are often assigned to them by 
patent-holders—should reduce aggregators’ net revenue.  The economic incentive to 
adopt this business model would thus decline. 
                                                          
100
  In this model, this case is reflected if firm j assigns part or all of its outbound knowledge flow activities, 
iz , 
to firm i, an IP aggregator. For firm i, the cost of being granted exclusive or sole enforcement rights to firm j’s 
invention would conceptually be equivalent to the exogenous cost of inventing, ic . If, thanks to its expertise 
in IP enforcement and economies of scale, the IP aggregator collects more income for firm j (and itself, to 
compensate for its services) than firm j would have obtained on its own, this decision is rationally sound for 
the inventive firm. In practice, firm j would also benefit by being able to focus its attention and resources in 
its other endeavours, for instance, developing an innovation. 
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(iii) In the absence of discrete leaps in other firms’ technology management choices, 
ii
iV

 0
 = 
ii
iz

 0
 ≥ 0 and 
jj
iV

 0
 = 0. Legal shifts that increase the focal firm’s 
expectations of patent protection in particular, or all firms’ expectations of patent 
protection in general, have a non-decreasing effect on a non-practicing entity’s 
expected value. 
 
Participation Constraint 
 
In a similar way as the development constraint, when the maximal value expected to be 
captured by a firm, iV , is negative, that firm aborts its technological activities and chooses 
neither to invent nor innovate. Whether the development constraint is satisfied or not 
determines whichever of Equations 1.2 or 5 is relevant as a starting point: the participation 
constraint, once inserting in other firms’ technology management choices, takes either of these 
two forms: 
iV ( i i , iq , λ
c
-i π-i, q
c
-i) = –
T
iC ( i i , iq , λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) – i
IP
iC  – 
S
iC ( iq )  
+ iR ( i i , iq ) ≥ 0 
0
iV ( i i , 0, λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) = – ic  + 
0
iz ( i i , 0, q
c
-i) – i
IP
iC  ≥ 0. 
Deconstructed in the traditional “Revenue ≥ Costs” formulation, the two possible participation 
constraints can respectively be rewritten as: 
iz ( i i , iq , q
c
-i) + iR ( i i , iq ) ≥ ic  + 
D
ic ( iq , λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) + i
IP
iC  + 
S
iC ( iq ) 
0
iz ( i i , 0, q
c
-i) ≥ ic  + i
IP
iC . 
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Theoretically, if a firm expects positive value, it has an economic incentive to participate 
to technological activities. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the role of the patent system as an 
incentive to technological endeavours is more ambiguous. It is obvious from the revenue sides 
of these constraints that when the general strength of all patents increases,
101
 patentees’ market 
positions for innovations are solidified, as well as their access to more valuable outbound 
knowledge flows. These effects corroborate the conventional wisdom of patents. Nonetheless, 
as value accruing from knowledge flows suggests, overall patent strength does not necessarily 
make patentees better off. Specifically, this observation is made when the positive value 
extracted from a firm’s strengthened patent protection is lower than the sum of increased costs 
of patent enforcement; of potential transactional value losses in inbound knowledge flows; and 
of costs of facing more and stronger patent infringement claims from other firms—firms are 
encouraged to litigate more because of a higher likelihood of success—albeit the focal firm’s 
defensive litigation costs are mitigated if it also patents its invention. Put simply, the overall 
assessment of patent strength must also consider the concomitant costs, and this evaluation 
does not yet reckon with patents’ main technology management alternative: secrecy. 
 
Mechanism Constraint 
 
The tension in technology management resides in the fact that it is not possible for firms 
to rationally choose both secrecy and IP protection: the firm has to choose only one of them—
or none, captured by the model as playing secrecy with c
iq  = 0. Theoretically, any anticipated 
parametric change affecting a firm’s decision-making dilemma has the potential to trigger 
discrete responses by the focal firm, through which it would jump from one technology 
management mechanism to the other. The mechanism constraint thus articulates the conditions 
under which discrete responses are not activated. In order to express it mathematically, it is 
necessary to examine technology management decisions more closely, the focus of the next 
subsection. 
                                                          
101
  Each of the components in the vector π, without underscript. 
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For the model, the importance of discussing these constraints, in addition to the 
observations they have allowed so far, stems from calculus. Because the model’s calculus 
generalizations require continuous functions, they do not necessarily stand when firms make 
discrete leaps germane to any of the constraints. For instance, it is assumed in the model that 
i
i
q
z


 ≤ 0. If firm i reduces its initially-chosen level of secrecy expectations, its expectations of 
net value accruing from outbound knowledge flows should be non-decreasing—due to lower 
transaction costs. This statement is false if firm i’s diminished secrecy is attributable to either 
its development or participation constraints not being met. In these cases, firm i steps out of 
development or the industrial environment altogether, thereby making impossible many or all 
valuable outbound knowledge flows. As a result, 
iz  is most likely diminished, whereas the 
model’s calculus assumptions assert that it should be non-decreasing. For these reasons, all of 
the model’s calculus generalizations are conditional on all three constraints being satisfied. 
 
3.2.2 Tension between Technology Management Mechanisms 
 
Internally, a firm’s technology management decision is a two-stage game. In the first 
stage, the firm chooses between secrecy and patent protection. In the second stage, if it 
initially chose patent protection, it is ready to reap its expected value. If the firm opted for 
secrecy instead, it then has to choose a level of secrecy expectations. The microeconomic 
analysis of rational technology managers’ decision-making process then consists, through 
backward induction, of first assessing the firm’s optimal level of secrecy expectations given 
that it chooses secrecy in the first stage, and, second, of comparing the firm’s expected value 
associated with this optimal level of secrecy expectations against the equivalent when it 
chooses patent protection. Rational technology managers pick the mechanism that yields the 
most expected value. 
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Step One: Optimal Level of Secrecy Expectations 
 
If the development constraint is not satisfied, it has already been observed and commented 
that the optimal choice of secrecy expectations must be zero. Hence, by construction, when 
technology managers select an optimal level of secrecy, the development constraint is 
necessarily satisfied. Likewise, c
i  = 0 once it is implied that a firm’s technology managers 
choose secrecy. Taking account of other firms’ simultaneous decision-making processes, the 
objective function becomes: 
S
iV (0, iq , λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) := – ic  – 
D
ic ( iq , λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) + iz (0, iq , q
c
-i) – 
S
iC ( iq )  
+ iq  [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ] + 
*
iR        (6) 
 
Assuming that all three constraints are satisfied for other players no matter the level of 
secrecy expectations firm i chooses, S
iV  is continuous with respect to iq . In that case, the 
calculus assumptions applying to iq  in Equations 2, 3 and 4 are sufficient to know that 
S
iV  is 
concave with respect to iq . Since iq    [0, 1], this concavity combines with the extreme value 
theorem to ascertain that if the derivative 
i
S
i
q
V


 = 0 contains an interior solution, this solution 
maximizes the firm’s expected value given that it chooses secrecy. Otherwise, the optimal 
level of secrecy must be located at one of the bounds, meaning that, in those cases, c
iq  
 {0, 1}, whichever bound is coupled with the highest expected value. 
 
In most situations, i.e., those in which an interior solution exists, the firm’s chosen level 
of secrecy expectations is determined by 
i
S
i
q
V


 = – 
i
D
i
q
c


 + 
i
i
q
z


 – 
i
S
i
dq
dC
 + M
iR  – 
*
iR = 0 
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M
iR  = 
*
iR  + 
i
D
i
q
c


 + 
i
S
i
dq
dC
 – 
i
i
q
z


 
(Marginal revenue of secrecy expectations = Marginal cost of secrecy expectations) 
c
iq  is defined indirectly as the level of secrecy expectations, if any, that solves this equality. In 
this model, because 
ji
i
qq
z

 2
 = 0,  
jji
D
i
q
c

 2
 = 0, and 
ji
D
i
qq
c

 2
 = 0, c
iq  is independent of the 
other arguments contained in S
iV . Should these assumptions be relaxed, these vectors would 
be arguments in the indirect function of c
iq . 
 
Social Sub-Optimality of Secrecy Choice 
 
Interestingly, when a firm rationally chooses its level of secrecy expectations in this way, 
social optimality, appraised from a producer-focused perspective, is generally not reached. 
This result stems from externalities in the industrial landscape that emerge when a firm plays 
secrecy. These social costs are not accounted for in the focal firm’s rational choice. For 
notational convenience, the proof is computed with respect to the rational choice and social 
optimality of 
jq , but the results aptly apply to iq  by virtue of firms’ symmetric decision-
making processes. 
 
From a producer-focused social perspective, expected social value is given by 


n
i 1
iV ( i i , iq , λ-i π-i , q-i). 
Keep in mind all observations made previously regarding the concave shape of jV  with 
respect to jq . Since Equation 3’s calculus assumptions indicate that the shape of iV  with 
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respect to 
jq  is also concave, it must be the case that these observations apply to the 
summation of all firms’ expected value functions. A firm’s choice of secrecy expectations is 
socially optimal when marginal social benefits of that firm’s choice equal its marginal social 
costs. Social costs and benefits expected from a marginal increase in 
jq  are given by 
j
n
i
i
q
V


1  = – 
j
D
j
q
c


 + 
j
j
q
z


 – 
j
S
j
dq
dC
 + MjR  – 
*
jR  – 
 
n
ji j
D
i
q
c
 + 
 
n
ji j
i
q
z
 
= 
j
S
j
q
V


– 
 
n
ji j
D
i
q
c
 + 
 
n
ji j
i
q
z
. 
If an interior solution exists for firm j’s socially optimal choice of secrecy expectations, *jq , it 
is given by the amount of secrecy expectations by which this equation equals zero.  
It has been demonstrated that an interior solution for cjq  is obtained when 
j
S
j
q
V


 = 0. 
Knowing, thanks to Equation 3’s calculus assumptions, that  
– 
 
n
ji j
D
i
q
c
 + 
 
n
ji j
i
q
z
 ≤ 0, 
marginal social costs of firm j’s choice of secrecy expectations are generally102 higher than 
firm j’s individual costs, while marginal social benefits are the same socially and individually. 
To counterbalance for these additional social costs, it must generally be the case that 
*
jq  ≤ 
c
jq , 
thence sub-optimality. 
 
                                                          
102
  “Generally” because the possibility that – 
 
n
ji j
D
i
q
c
 + 
 
n
ji j
i
q
z
 = 0 mathematically exists as the concavity is 
not strict. 
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Step Two: Choosing between Secrecy and Patent 
 
When firm i chooses to seek a patent, c
iq  = 0 and 
c
i  = 1, which simplifies that firm’s 
objective function to 
IP
iV ( i , 0, λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) := – ic  – 
D
ic (0, λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) + iz ( i , 0, q
c
-i) – 
IP
iC   
+ i [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ] + 
*
iR        (7) 
 
Replacing iq  by 
c
iq  in Equation 6 and comparing it with Equation 7, firm i strictly prefers 
patent protection when 
IP
iV ( i , 0, λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i)  > 
S
iV (0, 
c
iq , λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) 
i.e., if 
– D
ic (0, λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) + iz ( i , 0, q
c
-i) – 
IP
iC  + i [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ] >  
– D
ic (
c
iq , λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) + iz (0, 
c
iq , q
c
-i) – 
S
iC (
c
iq ) + 
c
iq  [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ]. (8) 
Should the inequality sign point in the opposite direction, firm i strictly prefers secrecy to 
patent protection.
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In absolute terms, Inequality 8 cannot be reduced further. Nonetheless, some observations 
can be made to identify some conditions under which Inequality 8 always stands. Based on the 
assumption of independence between firms’ choices of secrecy expectations and other firms’ 
technology management decisions, namely 
ji
i
qq
z

 2
 = 0, 
jji
D
i
q
c

 2
 = 0, and 
ji
D
i
qq
c

 2
 = 0, it 
must be the case that 
                                                          
103
  Should the two sides be equal, firm i would be indifferent between patent protection and secrecy. 
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iz ( i , 0, q
c
-i) ≥ iz (0, 
c
iq , q
c
-i) 
because 
i
i
q
z


 ≤ 0 and 
ii
iz


 ≥ 0 (see Equation 3’s calculus assumptions). Similarly, 
– D
ic (0, λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i) ≥ – 
D
ic (
c
iq , λ
c
-i π-i , q
c
-i)  
since 
i
D
i
q
c


 ≥ 0 (see also Equation 3’s calculus assumptions). 
 
Therefore, to find that Inequality 8 holds unequivocally for a firm, it is sufficient to show 
that 
i [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ] – 
IP
iC  > 
c
iq  [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ] – 
S
iC (
c
iq )     (9) 
Before examining two industrial contexts in which this inequality always stands, a few 
comments need to be expressed about Inequality 8 in order to better understand its role. 
 
Mechanism Constraint, Revisited 
 
Inequality 8 now allows the mechanism constraint to be described in mathematical form. 
The mechanism constraint is satisfied when Inequality 8 holds true whatever technology 
management decisions other firms make, taking full account of these decisions’ effects on 
firm i through potential knowledge flow interactions in the industrial environment. The 
mechanism constraint is also met mutatis mutandis if the inequality sign in Inequality 8 points 
in the other direction.
104
 In that event, the focal firm prefers to play secrecy instead of patent 
protection as is the case in Inequality 8’s standard formulation. In game theoretic language, for 
Inequality 8 to always apply, patent protection—or its secrecy adaptation—must be firm i’s 
                                                          
104
  To be clear, Inequality 8’s reversible property does not translate to Inequality 9, which confines the latter’s 
applicability. 
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best response to each of the other firms’ sets of contemplated strategies, in other words, one of 
the two technology management mechanisms is a dominant strategy for firm i. Since all firms 
face the same constraints and decision-making processes, if Inequality 8—with the inequality 
sign pointing in any of the two directions for each of them—applies to all the firms active in 
an industrial environment, this strategy set constitutes a dominant-strategy, thus pure-strategy, 
Nash Equilibrium (“NE”) for the industrial environment. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that 
all firms satisfy the mechanism constraint for a dominant- or pure-strategy NE to exist: for 
instance, if it is a dominant strategy for firm i to seek patent protection for its invention, a 
pure-strategy NE does not require that firm j’s decision be a best response to firm i choosing 
positive expectations of secrecy. From there and through cascading dominant strategies, a 
unique dominant- or pure-strategy NE can be obtained in the industrial environment without 
the mechanism constraint being satisfied for some of the players involved. Nash Equilibria of 
this model in a two-player game are further analyzed in Section 3.3, in which the mechanism 
constraint is fully relaxed as it is endogenously integrated into that two-player variant. 
 
Copyright Protection of Computer Programs 
 
It has been mentioned several times that the model applies to all regimes of IP, sometimes 
with a few adjustments. For inventions that are protectable with more than one IP regime, it is 
possible to analyze them through the lens of overlapping applications of the model, each 
taking into account distinct dimensions of secrecy. This is the case of computer programs, 
discussed in Subsection 1.3.1, for which patent and copyright protections coexist. In the 
copyright perspective of this model, computer programs are singularly relevant as they are the 
most inventive of copyrightable works. 
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For decades now, doubts about the validity of copyright protection granted to computer 
programs have been dispelled. In addition, this protection is free
105
 and is granted 
automatically to any original source code or interface, without particular costs or efforts.
106
 
For a firm whose invention is a computer program and on which this model’s analytical 
framework and assumptions are applied, expectations of copyright protection are very high, 
while concomitant costs are trivial, meaning that: 
i    1 and 
IP
iC    0.  
Transposed in Inequality 9, these parametric values are sufficient to guarantee that the 
inequality holds true, and thus that Inequality 8 stands as well. For a computer programming 
firm, copyright protection is a dominant strategy.  
 
By aggregating these parametric values in an industrial environment composed entirely 
of computer programming firms adopting open innovation practices, it can be surmised that a 
dominant-strategy NE exists, with all firms playing copyright protection. In fact, this reality 
has been skimmed over en passant in Chapter 1. Whereas two ideologies in this industry feud 
regarding patent protection of computer programs, opposing F/OSS communities to other 
actors more willing to use exclusionary means, it is interesting to observe that both currents 
support copyright protection and actively rely on it in their industrial and business activities 
(Phillips 2009; Murray, Piper and Robertson 2014b). The model suggests that, at least in 
relation to copyright protection, decisions that are often considered ideological are actually 
predicated on rational grounds. In contrast, for patents over computer programs, it is generally 
not the case that i    1 or that 
IP
iC    0. Unsurprisingly, an equilibrium by which all 
computer programming firms would choose to patent their inventions and actively use these 
patents, as is the case with copyright, does not exist. 
                                                          
105
  Free as in “free beer”, this time. See supra note 14. 
106
  Jurisdictional standards of originality vary (Gervais and Judge 2011), but suffice it to say that originality is 
not a standard as demanding as patent law’s novelty criterion. Originality is closer to “the work originates 
from the author.” Unless a computer programmer copies a previously-existing code or makes only minor 
variations, the copyright protection of that programmer’s work is ipso facto nearly certain. 
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Tacit Secrets 
 
Tacit knowledge, like skills, know-how and unarticulated business methods,
107
 can be 
tricky to secure since it exists mostly in the cognitive memory of people who are in contact 
with it. Should a firm wish to keep this knowledge under its exclusive purview, few secrecy-
enhancing measures are suitable. They mostly rely on covenants not to compete and similar 
clauses in employees’ work contracts. Yet, in some jurisdictions, notably California, 
covenants not to compete in labour contracts are void (Gilson 1999). Besides, a variety of 
exogenous legal shifts or industrial contexts could impair firms’ access to reliable secrecy-
enhancing means (Lemley 2011). When a firm’s invention consists in tacit knowledge such as 
consulting or banking services, and the firm inhabits an industrial environment peculiarly 
obstructive for secrecy, these circumstances can be fitted in the model by assuming that there 
are no reliable secrecy-enhancing measures at the firm’s disposal. A context like this, unusual 
indeed but still plausible around tacit inventive knowledge, entails that c
iq  = 0.
108
 Since 
Equation 2 dictates that S
iC (0) = 0, Inequality 9 is simplified to 
i [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ] – 
IP
iC  > 0. 
 
In this industrial environment, building on the steps that transformed Inequality 8 into 
Inequality 9, any combination of parameters by which 
i [
M
iR  – 
*
iR ] > 
IP
iC  
is sufficient to ascertain IP protection as a dominant strategy for firm i. Furthermore, this 
inequality suggests that legal shifts that boost firm i’s expectations of IP protection increase its 
likelihood that IP protection constitutes a dominant strategy. Unlike in the case of copyright 
                                                          
107
  See Section 2.3. 
108
  See note 76 and accompanying text. The caveat contained therein is particularly important as the minimal 
level of secrecy in the absence of secrecy-enhancing measures is likely to be higher for tacit knowledge—
because of its sticky nature—than for articulate knowledge. 
88 
 
protection of computer programs, though, because these parameters are individualized for 
each firm, the presence of this industrial environment’s special conditions is hardly sufficient 
to envision a pan-industrial dominant-strategy NE, even by supposing the unlikely scenario by 
which all firms face the exogenous constraint c
iq  = 0. 
 
3.2.3 Complex and Simple Innovations 
 
Conceptually, innovations can be divided in two categories: complex and simple (Merges 
and Nelson 1990). On the one hand, complex—or cumulative—innovations require a variety 
of different input components, and these innovations, in turn, can themselves be integrated as 
input in plenty of other innovation processes. Complexity is a feature of most innovations in 
the software and electronics industries, among others, as well as in industries producing pieces 
for transportation vehicles such as automobiles, trains and aircraft. On the other hand, simple, 
or discrete, innovations need only a small number of components and similarly have a limited 
usability in other firms’ innovation processes. Pharmaceuticals and innovative alterations of 
everyday objects like razors and forks share these characteristics.  
 
It is generally recognized that firms rely on different innovation processes and business 
plans depending on whether the innovation is complex or simple (Scotchmer 2004; Merges 
and Nelson 1990). In an industrial environment where firms generally adopt practices of open 
innovation, the distinctive attributes of simple innovations support a presumption that firms 
that produce them participate in only a few knowledge flows, but the relative importance of 
these partnerships is relatively high. Conversely, when firms develop complex innovations 
with a mindset of open innovation, it is likely that they maintain many knowledge flows, even 
though most of them, individually, have a relatively minor impact. If a firm’s partner, 
participating in either an inbound or an outbound knowledge flow, drops out of the industry, 
the focal firm is more likely to find a substitute partner to replace that knowledge flow and 
89 
 
thus compensate for its value loss if its innovation is complex rather than simple, particularly 
if n is high. 
 
In this model, this dichotomy helps in assessing the industrial contexts in which the direct 
effects of legal shifts on other firms’ technology management decisions are more or less likely 
to bear significant repercussions in the focal firm’s technology management dilemma. These 
cascading ramifications are presumed to be relatively more significant when the focal firm 
develops a simple innovation. Although a focal firm that develops a complex innovation can 
expect a greater number of ripple effects that surface because of legal shifts imposing 
themselves on other firms’ technology management decisions, individually, each of these 
indirect effects should be relatively minor or null thanks to the focal firm’s fast and easy 
access to equivalent alternatives. Based on this logic, firms that develop simple innovations 
are more susceptible to actual leaps in the model’s three constraints. Consequently, it is 
relatively more reasonable to assume that the model’s calculus generalizations stand in the 
case of a focal firm that develops a complex innovation. 
 
3.3 The Variant Model—Two-Firm Interactions 
 
Without adding many additional layers of assumptions and thereby losing interpretive 
generality, it is difficult to examine the interactions in an industrial landscape composed of a 
high number of firms because of the multiplicity of scenarios. A two-firm industrial 
environment allows a comprehensive breakdown of firms’ technology management choices, 
of interactions between these choices, and of the effects of legal shifts on the focal firm’s 
strategies. Because of players’ interactions, the analysis must proceed with a game theoretic 
approach. The game represents step two of Subsection 3.2.2’s study of technology 
management decisions, although in greater details. First, the game is solved by determining 
under what conditions, for parameters, a unique, dominant-strategy NE exists. A dominant 
strategy NE usually arises when the two players do not potentially litigate in the event that 
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both seek patent protection. Regarding the focal firm’s expected value and its propensity to 
choose patent protection, the analysis of legal shifts over dominant strategies are on par with 
intuitive incentive theory. Then, supposing that the emergence of a dominant-strategy NE is 
hampered by parameters’ values, the game explores the possibility of multiple pure-strategy 
NE. Next, by supposing again the absence of a firm’s dominant strategy, the game’s mixed-
strategy NE is identified in terms of the model’s parameters and initial variables. Last, 
potential effects on the focal firm’s strategy of legal shifts modifying the expectations of 
patent protection over that firm’s invention are analyzed in the case of a mixed-strategy NE. 
There, the results are more ambiguous, thereby colliding with the intuition of a non-decreasing 
propensity to rely on patent protection when associated expectations increase. 
 
Unless specified otherwise, firm i should be read as the focal firm in this section’s 
analysis. In the same vein, i  and j  should respectively be interpreted as expectations that 
the focal firm’s patent is valid and enforceable and as corresponding expectations applying to 
the other firm’s prospective patent. Since firms face symmetric technology management 
problems despite their individualized parameters and variables, the analysis applies mutatis 
mutandis to firm j as a focal firm. 
 
3.3.1 Let the Game Begin 
 
The two players simultaneously choose among two strategies: patent protection or 
secrecy. Prior to the start of the game, each firm assesses its optimal choice of secrecy 
expectations in the way described in step one of Subsection 3.2.2. For firm i, the probability of 
choosing patent protection is denoted u, u   [0, 1]. Firm j’s concomitant probability of 
patenting its internal invention is given by l, l   [0, 1].
109
 As shown in the normal form of the 
game outlined as Figure 4, four potential outcomes of firms’ expected value sets arise 
depending on the strategies played by each player. 
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  u for up, l for left. 
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The focal firm’s expected value, based on each of these outcomes’ probabilities, is given 
by 
ul [ – T
iC ( i , 0, j , 0) – 
IP
iC  + iR ( i , 0) ]  
+ [ u – ul ] [ – T
iC ( i , 0, 0, 
c
jq ) – 
IP
iC + iR ( i , 0) ]  
+ [ l – ul ] [ – T
iC (0, 
c
iq , j , 0) – 
S
iC (
c
iq )+ iR (0, 
c
iq ) ]  
+ [ 1 – u – l + ul ] [ – T
iC (0, 
c
iq , 0, 
c
jq ) – 
S
iC (
c
iq ) + iR (0, 
c
iq ) ]. 
 
After cleaning terms that cancel themselves and ascribing each term to the probability 
variable(s) that apply(ies) to it, the focal firm’s expected value, in terms of variables u and l, is 
linearly given by the game theoretic objective function 
G
iV ( u, l ) = Ai + u Bi + l Gi + ul Hi       (10) 
where Ai is a constant regrouping terms that are unaffected by the players’ strategies; Bi is the 
constant of terms directly proportional with the focal firm’s probability of seeking patent 
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j j ,
c
jq ) ; 
jV (
c
j j ,
c
jq ,
c
i i , 
c
iq )) 
Firm j’s strategy sets: ( cj j ,
c
jq ) 
( j , 0) with Pr. [ l ] (0, 
c
jq ) with Pr. [ 1 – l ] 
F
ir
m
 i
’s
 s
tr
at
eg
y
 s
et
s:
  
(λ
ic
 π
i ,
 q
ic
) 
( i , 0) with Pr. 
[ u ] 
(– T
iC ( i , 0, j , 0) – 
IP
iC   
+ iR ( i , 0); 
– TjC ( j , 0, i , 0) – 
IP
jC   
+ 
jR ( j , 0)) 
(– T
iC ( i , 0, 0, 
c
jq ) – 
IP
iC  
+ iR ( i , 0); 
– TjC (0, 
c
jq , i , 0) – 
S
jC (
c
jq )  
+ 
jR (0, 
c
jq )) 
(0, c
iq ) with Pr. 
[ 1 – u ] 
(– T
iC (0, 
c
iq , j , 0) – 
S
iC (
c
iq ) 
+ iR (0, 
c
iq ); 
– TjC ( j , 0, 0, 
c
iq ) – 
IP
jC   
+ 
jR ( j , 0)) 
(– T
iC (0, 
c
iq , 0, 
c
jq ) – 
S
iC (
c
iq )  
+ iR (0, 
c
iq ); 
– TjC (0, 
c
jq , 0, 
c
iq ) – 
S
jC (
c
jq )  
+ 
jR (0, 
c
jq )) 
Figure 4: Two-player game in normal form 
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protection for its invention; Gi is the equivalent of Bi regarding the other firm’s probability of 
itself choosing patent protection; and Hi is a constant of terms directly proportional with the 
firms’ mixed probabilities of playing patent protection.  
 
To facilitate the computation and analysis of the game, each of these four sets of 
parameters are disaggregated in Table 1, including some of their derivatives with respect to 
j . Originating from Equation 3’s calculus assumptions, these derivatives are helpful to 
discuss the potential effects of legal shifts on the focal firm’s strategy. The notation is slightly 
altered though, in order to take into consideration cross-interactions in third-segment revenues 
and costs of patent enforcement in this model’s version, where T
iC  and its components have 
been parameterized. When the focal firm’s development costs, D
ic , are differentiated, they are 
marked )0(Dic  if one of the two firms plays secrecy. In that case, “0” portrays the absence of 
interaction. Conversely, if both firms play patent protection, D
ic ’s and iz ’s functions to be 
differentiated are marked as )( i
D
ic   and )( jiz  . This notation reflects the idea that, usually, 
i  and j  are independent from 
D
ic  and iz  respectively, but not in these cases, owing to 
cross-interactions.
110
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jjii
iz
 
 2
 ≤ 0, and 
iijj
D
ic
 
 2
 ≤ 0; see Equation 3’s calculus assumptions. 
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Table 1: Constants of firm i’s expected payoff in a two-player game and their derivatives 
Ai = – T
iC (0, 
c
iq , 0, 
c
jq ) – 
S
iC (
c
iq ) + iR (0, 
c
iq ) = iV (0, 
c
iq , 0,
c
jq ) 
Bi = – T
iC ( i , 0, 0, 
c
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iC + iR ( i , 0)  
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S
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In this two-player industrial environment, Equation 10 allows the reformulation of the 
participation constraint in more precise terms: 
G
iV ( u, l ) = Ai + u Bi + l Gi + ul Hi ≥ 0.  
Regarding the development constraint, terms and derivatives in G
iV  are sufficiently general to 
accommodate a firm’s adapted objective function should its development constraint not be 
satisfied. Finally, the mechanism constraint is fully relaxed by virtue of this variant’s 
simplification to a two-player environment, which enables the game to endogenously 
internalize firms’ technology management decisions. 
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3.3.2 Nash Equilibria 
 
When acting rationally, the focal firm chooses u in a way that maximizes Equation 10. At 
first glance, the focal firm has no control over the components Ai and [ l Gi ]. Because of 
Equation 10’s linear shape with respect to u, and taking into account that l is not a constant but 
a variable fully within the control of the other firm, this maximization process implies the 
result 
   1 if   Bi + l Hi > 0 
u*   0 if   Bi + l Hi < 0     (11) 
  [0 , 1] if  Bi + l Hi = 0 
 
Dominant-Strategy NE 
 
Since the focal firm’s optimal decision rests on the other firm’s choice of l, interactions 
between both firms’ strategies must be discussed in order to assess NE. There is an exception 
though: if Hi = 0, the focal firm’s optimal choice of u does not interact with the other firm’s 
choice, letting the focal firm choose u* = 0 or u* = 1 depending on whether Bi is positive or 
negative. Table 1 indicates that  
Bi = iV ( i ,0, 0,
c
jq ) – iV (0, 
c
iq , 0,
c
jq ). 
In a logical way, Bi is positive, and playing patent protection is a dominant strategy for the 
focal firm, when choosing patent protection is the focal firm’s best response to the other firm 
choosing secrecy, given, of course, that Hi = 0. Otherwise, playing secrecy is a dominant 
strategy for the focal firm. In the absence of third-segment interactions captured in Hi, the 
focal firm’s best response when the other firm plays secrecy necessarily translates as the focal 
firm’s best response when the other firm chooses patent protection instead. Since the players’ 
decision-making processes are symmetric, and interactions are by definition reciprocal, the 
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absence thereof likely leads to the other firm also having a dominant strategy in this game. If 
both Hi = 0 and Bi = 0, the focal firm is strictly indifferent between patent protection and 
secrecy, and both constitute a best response to the other firm’s strategy, whichever it is.  
 
In sum, Hi = 0, Bi ≠ 0 and Bj ≠ 0 are the conditions by which both firms have a dominant 
strategy in this game, which would lead to a dominant- (and pure-) strategy NE. Hi = 0 when 
– T
iC ( i , 0, j , 0) + 
T
iC ( i , 0, 0, 
c
jq ) + 
T
iC (0, 
c
iq , j , 0) – 
T
iC (0, 
c
iq , 0, 
c
jq ) = 0. 
Because Equation 3’s calculus assumptions imply that 
jji
T
i
q
C

 2
 = 0,  
ji
T
i
qq
C

 2
 = 0, the 
most important of these conditions, Hi = 0, happens when the two firms do not interact 
regarding third-segment revenues of patent enforcement, on a case-by-case basis. More 
precisely, this situation occurs when neither of the two firms litigates against the other in the 
event that both patent their inventions. Absent these court interactions, the positive and 
negative signs in front of these four T
iC  terms necessitate that each of the arguments’ 
increasing and decreasing effects cancel themselves as they do not vary between terms. In 
turn, Hi = 0.
111
 
 
With a dominant-strategy NE, the focal firm’s expected value equals 
D
iV ( u*, l* ) = Ai + u* Bi + l* Gi , 
where the choice of u* depends on whether patent protection is a best response to the other 
firm playing secrecy. Analysis of the other firm’s ensuing strategy and each firm’s respective 
expected value, including effects of legal shifts, follows straightforwardly with the help of 
                                                          
111
  Theoretically, the terms also cancel themselves in the very unlikely event that both firms initiate patent 
litigation procedures, and the bi-directional net value results of the firms’ technology management 
interactions are equal. Plainly, when “what one earns by [its own] patent, one loses by [the other’s] patent”. 
Since each of the model’s parameters is individualized, the probability of this occurrence is extremely small. 
In order to lighten the text, this slim possibility is not analyzed any further in this paper, nor is it referred to. 
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Table 1 and Equation 3’s calculus assumptions. Conditional on each of the two firms’ 
participation constraints being satisfied with this unique, dominant-strategy set: 
(i) Legal shifts enhancing the focal firm’s expectations of patent protection increase the 
likelihood that patent protection constitutes a dominant strategy for that firm, and thus 
that it seeks patent protection for its invention. 
(ii) If the focal firm plays patent protection, a legal shift boosting its expectations of patent 
protection affects its expected value positively, thereby incentivizing its participation 
in the technological game. 
(iii) Conversely, legal shifts increasing the other firm’s expectations of patent protection, in 
the event that its dominant strategy is to play patent protection or that the increment is 
significant enough to elicit the other firm to switch to patent protection as its 
technology management choice, likely erode the focal firm’s expected value, thus 
bringing down its incentive to invent and innovate as well. 
 
Other Pure-Strategy NE 
 
The analysis of Hi has indicated that the main condition for the absence of dominant 
strategy is an interaction between both firms in the event that they both play patent protection. 
In the model’s construction, this situation only arises if one or both of the firms seek(s) 
revenue through patent litigation. In order to continue the game’s analysis, the rest of this 
section, and of this chapter, posits that these court interactions qualify the two firms’ 
relationship in the game. 
 
In that context, there is (are) either zero or two pure-strategy NE. In line with Set 11, there 
is no pure-strategy NE when: 
1) If the focal firm plays u = 1, the other firm’s best response is to play l such that 
Bi + l Hi < 0; and 
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2) If the focal firm plays u = 0, the other firm’s best response is to play l such that 
Bi + l Hi > 0. 
By reversing the signs, the game contains two pure-strategy NE when: 
1) If the focal firm plays u = 1, the other firm’s best response is to play l such that 
Bi + l Hi > 0; and 
2) If the focal firm plays u = 0, the other firm’s best response is to play l such that 
Bi + l Hi < 0. 
In the case where there are two pure-strategy NE, which depends entirely on the firms’ 
parameters, there might be coordination problems between both firms’ simultaneous decisions, 
as is typically the case in Bach-Stravinsky games. Coordination issues can be market-based, 
for instance a rivalry for the same customer base. Other times, they are regulatory, typically 
stemming from antitrust law and authorities. Identifying a NE that is not plagued by 
coordination problems is particularly relevant in these settings. 
 
Mixed-Strategy NE 
 
So long as there is no dominant-strategy NE, there is a mixed-strategy NE. In Set 11, it is 
specified that the focal firm chooses patent protection with any probability when 
[Bi + l Hi = 0]. The focal firm’s indifference in its chosen probability of playing patent 
protection results from the computation that, when [Bi + l Hi = 0], the focal firm’s expected 
payoff becomes, by converting Equation 10, 
iV ( u, l ) = Ai + l
c
 Gi        (12) 
where u, the focal firm’s only variable within its control at this stage of the game, has no effect 
on the focal firm’s expectations of technological value. This result is achieved when the other 
firm plays patent protection with a probability of 
98 
 
MSl  = 
i
i
H
B
   conditional on Hi ≠ 0.
112
 
This equality is obtained by isolating l in [Bi + l Hi = 0]. 
 
If the focal firm simultaneously plays a strategy that also renders the other firm indifferent 
with respect to its own probability of choosing patent protection, by their mutual indifference, 
each of the firms’ strategies would be a best response to the vis-à-vis’ strategy—the definition 
of a NE. With this strategy set, the game would find a mixed-strategy NE. By symmetry of 
both firms’ strategies, parameters and variables, the focal firm’s strategy that makes the other 
firm indifferent is 
MSu  = 
j
j
H
B
   conditional on Hj ≠ 0. 
The mixed-strategy NE is thus the strategy set ( MSu , MSl  ) = (
j
j
H
B
 ,
i
i
H
B
 ). Equation 12 
represents the focal firm’s expected value when the game is in a mixed-strategy NE, 
conditional to this expected value to be positive—the participation constraint. By inserting in 
it the other firm’s mixed-strategy choice in a NE, the focal firm’s expected value in a mixed-
strategy NE can be defined in terms of the game’s parameters: 
MS
iV  = Ai 
i
ii
H
GB
          (13) 
 
In the absence of a dominant-strategy NE, the mixed-strategy NE offers notable 
interpretive advantages over its counterpart pure-strategy NE. If there are pure-strategy NE, 
which is uncertain, they come as a pair, and their associated strategies and expected 
technological values vary depending on the parameters, on a case-by-case basis. The mixed-
                                                          
112
  Not coincidentally, the prior analysis of Hi shows that this condition is satisfied by positing that the game 
does not contain any dominant-strategy NE.  
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strategy NE, however, is unique; it defines each firm’s equilibrium strategy and expected 
value in terms of the game’s general parameters; and its existence is ascertained so long as 
there is no dominant-strategy NE. When fierce rivalry or exogenous conditions do not allow or 
support the coordination of decisions by firms, for instance because of antitrust regulations, a 
focal firm can find it desirable to select a strategy that fully anticipates the other firm’s 
strategy. By symmetry, the other firm is likely to also plan this way. Rendering the counterpart 
indifferent by playing the mixed-strategy set is one way by which they can obtain this 
advantage. For these reasons, this model’s last step—the analysis of the impact on the focal 
firm’s strategy of legal shifts affecting expectations of patent protection related to its 
invention—takes the two-firm mixed-strategy NE as the industrial environment subjected to 
an exogenous shock. 
 
3.3.3 Analysis of the Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 
 
The analysis of exogenous legal shifts that marginally decrease or increase expectations of 
patent protection associated with the focal firm’s invention focuses on the effects on that 
firm’s strategy. The circumstances under which these legal shifts increase or decrease the focal 
firm’s probability to apply for patent protection are computed and discussed. As seen with the 
analysis of the dominant strategy NE, the basic intuition is that when expectations of patent 
protection for the focal firm’s invention increase, that firm’s likelihood of seeking patent 
protection should likewise increase. Because of the peculiar context of a mixed-strategy NE 
defined by this model’s assumptions, this initial impression is contradicted in some 
situations.
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 It is shown that, in a mixed-strategy NE, the nature of legal shifts’ effects 
depends mostly on the other firm’s behaviour and parameters, as the focal firm adapts its own 
strategy to maintain the other firm in an indifferent state. 
                                                          
113
  Unlike the legal shift dissected in this subsection, the effects of legal shifts on both firms’ expected values are 
non-conclusive. Too many determinants interact in a way that a great deal of additional assumptions would 
need to be joined to the computation in order to merely obtain a very limited and case-specific prediction of 
legal shifts’ effects. Interested readers are invited to use Table 1 and Equation 3’s calculus assumptions if they 
wish to delve into these results. 
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In this computation, the symmetric arrangement of the game is put to contribution. Since 
Table 1 focuses on constants related to firm i and these terms determine MSl , firm j’s strategy, 
firm j is referred to as the focal firm here, while firm i is the other firm. This way, the 
outcomes on the focal firm’s strategy of a legal shift marginally increasing j  are examined. 
 
Effects of Legal Shifts—Expectations on the Focal Firm’s Invention 
 
Conditional on the absence of dominant strategies, the focal firm’s mixed-strategy in a NE 
is defined as [ MSl  = 
i
i
H
B
 ]. The effect on the focal firm’s strategy of a legal shift on 
expectations of patent protection for its invention can be computed by differentiating its 
equilibrium strategy with respect to j : 
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The last equality sign is obtained by replacing the constants and their derivatives by their 
corresponding computations in Table 1.  
 
Knowing that Hi ≠ 0, it must be the case that the denominator is positive. Hence, an 
exogenous marginal augmentation of patent protection expectations for the focal firm’s 
invention increases this firm’s likelihood to patent if: 
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Consider that each set of brackets represents a term. The first bracket term is positive 
when the other firm’s best response to the focal firm choosing secrecy is patent protection, 
while it is negative when it is not the case.  
 
In the second bracket term, since the absence of dominant strategy implies litigation in the 
event that both firms seek patent protection, and 
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This difference captures the marginal hike in the other firm’s development costs that does not 
occur when its decision to patent relatively reduces patent litigation risks and expected costs. 
jj
jiz



 )(
 represents the other firm’s loss of potential patent litigation revenue due to the 
relative defense that the focal firm’s marginally-increased expectations of patent protection 
provide itself. This component is negative because 
jjii
iz
 
 2
 ≤ 0. All three components of 
the second term put together, they represent the other firm’s net value gain or loss emanating 
from marginally-increasing patent litigation interactions—a gain if that second bracket term is 
positive, otherwise, a loss. 
 
Combining the two terms together, a legal shift increasing expectations of patent 
protection for the focal firm’s invention likewise increases this firm’s equilibrium probability 
to seek patent protection in two scenarios: 
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i) Inequality 14’s two bracket terms are positive. Here, in any case, the other firm 
relatively benefits from itself choosing patent protection—enhanced patent litigation 
interactions yield marginally increasing positive net value for the other firm, and patent 
protection is the other firm’s best response to the focal firm choosing secrecy. The 
other firm’s parameters determine, in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, the focal firm’s 
likelihood of patenting its invention. As seen with the analysis of the dominant-strategy 
NE, an exogenous increase in the focal firm’s expectations of patent protection reduces 
the other firm’s expected value. Since the focal firm plays a strategy that maintains the 
other firm in indifference, the focal firm wishes to counterbalance the exogenous 
shock’s direct effects on the other firm by enhancing its probability to patent, since the 
other firm possesses an unequivocal best response to this move. By this response, the 
focal firm keeps the other firm indifferent. 
ii) Inequality 14’s two terms are negative. The analysis when the two terms are positive 
applies similarly. In this case, secrecy is the other firm’s best response when the focal 
firm plays secrecy. In the event that both firms play patent protection, the other firm’s 
net value is eroded with marginally-increasing patent litigation interactions. Here as 
well, in order to keep the other firm indifferent, the focal firm wants to counterbalance 
the expected loss of value for the other firm that results from the legal shift. The focal 
firm reacts by enhancing its own probability to seek patent protection since the other 
firm’s parameters indicate that it benefits unequivocally from this move. 
 
If parameters’ values do not lead to one of these two situations, the focal firm’s likelihood 
to patent in a two-firm mixed-strategy NE actually declines as expectations of patent 
protection for its invention increase. The foregoing analysis applies mutatis mutandis in the 
event that Inequality 14 is negative. Presumably, since higher expectations of patent protection 
reduce the other firm’s expected value, the only means at the focal firm’s disposal to repair the 
other firm’s state of indifference is to in turn reduce its likelihood to apply for patent 
protection. In sum, in a mixed-strategy NE, it is mostly the other firm’s parameters that dictate 
the focal firm’s response to legal shifts. This adjustment does not necessarily go in the 
direction that would appear rational and intuitive in a basic microeconomic analysis. 
  
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze the effects of legal shifts in relation with IP in an 
industrial environment characterized by open innovation in general, more particularly with 
respect to firms’ technology management decisions.  
 
In Chapter 1, the nature and actual effects of these potential legal changes have been 
delved into, most notably through patent law cases in the banking services industry and in the 
biotechnological sector. It has also been discussed that legal shifts may occur in other regimes 
of IP like copyright and trademarks. In some circumstances, these shifts affect an entire 
industry while, other times, their impact is confined to a single firm. The cases and legal 
theory generally indicate that legal shifts affect firms through their expectations of IP 
protection over their inventions and innovative products. Legal shifts can boost these 
expectations, as is evidently the case with trade agreements, while other times they erode 
them, as recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions did with respect to computerized business 
methods. In whichever directions, it appears that results on firms’ responses and incentive to 
partake in inventive and innovate activities are ambiguous. Better understanding this 
ambiguity and determining particular circumstances under which this ambiguity is dissolved 
constitute some of the goals of this paper’s economic treatment. 
 
Then, in Chapter 2, the importance of the distinction between inventions and innovations 
has been stressed. On the one hand, inventions are new yet inchoate. They are applications or 
implementations of technological ideas. On the other hand, innovations combine a number of 
input and design components, at least one of which is an invention or an inventive design, in 
order to bring them to market and, eventually, customers. This distinction is particularly 
significant because economic models tend to amalgamate the two and ascribe to inventions 
effects and assumptions that only apply to innovations, or vice-versa. The distinction between 
104 
inventions and innovations was the main driver behind the decision to assume that industrial 
landscapes analyzed in this paper are characterized by open innovation. As a management 
model that focuses on knowledge flows between firms and actors inhabiting the industrial 
environment, open innovation not only captures the distinction between inventions and 
innovations, but it also procures an empirical analysis of inter-firm relationships. The 
relevance of open innovation in this paper has been highlighted with an adaptation of Baldwin 
and von Hippel’s 2010 model of viability for innovation modes: there are many reasons to 
believe that open innovation is a particularly viable model in the current technological context, 
where ICT act as a wave that raises the entire field of technology development. The pace, 
quality and cost-efficiency of technological activities have been significantly improving in this 
context. 
 
Next, a microeconomic model has been set up in Chapter 3, representing firms’ inter-
relationships in an industrial environment where it was assumed that firms adopt an open 
innovation approach. Because of this assumption, knowledge flows by which firms interact at 
the inventive and innovative stages while yet competing on the market stage bring a distinctive 
flavour to the model. By having firms choose between two technology management 
mechanisms—patents and secrecy—it was then possible to ascribe the effects of these 
decisions on firms’ cost and revenue determinants. In turn, multi-firm analyses of this model 
were developed, particularly with the goal of determining firms’ development and 
participation constraints in this environment, as well as to assess the processes by which firms 
choose their optimal technology management mechanism. Along this track, comments and 
findings were made about the nature of some industries or business models, such as non-
practicing entities and the widespread use of licenses and copyright law by computer-
programming firms. At different moments, the effects of legal shifts have been evaluated. 
 
The main assessment, however, took place at the end of the model’s exploration, in a two-
firm game theoretic version of the model. Having identified circumstances where there are 
dominant-, pure- and mixed-strategy Nash Equilibria, it has then been possible to assess the 
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impact of legal shifts regarding a focal firm’s expectations of IP protection. In a dominant-
strategy Nash Equilibrium, the results supported the conventional intuition that higher 
expectations of patent protection for a focal firm can increase the likelihood that this firm 
manages its technology with patent protection, possibly increasing the net value it expects to 
capture for its technology and its incentive to participate in technological endeavours. 
Conversely, also in a dominant-strategy Nash Equilibrium, legal shifts increasing other firms’ 
concomitant expectations can have the adverse effect on the focal firm’s expected value, 
potentially reducing in turn its incentive to participate in technological development. Last, in a 
two-firm mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium, the effects of legal shifts on a focal firm vary with 
respect to the other firms’ parameters, through firms’ interactions. Depending on the decision 
a focal firm must make to keep its vis-à-vis indifferent, a legal shift that increases the focal 
firm’s expectations of patent protection over its invention can increase as well as reduce the 
probability with which it seeks patent protection. This last result is counter-intuitive. 
 
Interestingly, in the model, interactions between technology management mechanisms 
had been kept low. They only took place through patent litigation interplay. A strong 
assumption consisted in considering that a firm’s choice of secrecy expectations is 
independent of other firms’ concomitant choices, for either secrecy or IP protection. One of 
the reasons supporting this decision was to keep the model manageable. Considering that a 
single interactive scenario was sufficient to identify counter-intuitive effects of legal shifts in a 
mixed-strategy equilibrium, finding a way to extend these interplays to an extent closer to 
reality could produce meaningful results. They could reduce, amplify or transform this 
model’s findings. Likewise, a detailed application in a multi-firm environment would produce 
interesting developments. Other potentially fruitful adaptations of the model could analyze in 
greater detail distinctions between the effects of patent validity and patent enforceability, 
which in this model were captured with a single individualized parameter. As well, inventive 
processes were determined by nature. Integrating the experimentation stages of making 
inventions, and interactions with legal standards and shifts, could provide significant insights. 
There are so many possibilities, and they are left to inventive and innovative minds—this 
paper’s contribution to knowledge flows. 
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